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THE IDEA OF ADOPTION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY OF
ADULT ADOPTEE ACCESS TO BIRTH RECORDS

Elizabeth J. Samuels*
There is intense debate taking place around the country about
whether to open birth records to adult adoptees. Our understanding
of the legal history relevant to this debate is incomplete and inaccurate. This Article provides a more accurate history of adult adoptees'
access to birth records, and it uses that history to analyze what has
been a complex relationship in this area of law between legal rules
and social attitudes. The analysis traces how social attitudes and
understandings have likely affected the construction of rules, how
rules in turn appear to have affected attitudes, and how, finally, attitudes may have extended and perpetuated rules.
In 1942 I had gone to the Probate Court ... and looked up my first
adoption paper, and saw my mother's full name signed by her own
hand. There was no rigmarole then; you were allowed to see your
own paper in a kindly procedure. 1
-Jean Paton, Adoptee.
[E]very person has a right to know who he is and who his people
were. 2
-Maud Morlock, U.S. Children's Bureau, 1946.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A history of adoption law has not been available that is complete

* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; J.D., University of
Chicago School of Law, 1980; A.B., Harvard College, 1975. I would like to thank the
University of Baltimore Educational Foundation, which provided financial support;
the University of Baltimore Law Library for its superb services, especially those of
Robin Klein and Harvey Morrell; students Beverly Heydon, William Thomas (Trip)
Nesbitt, Kerryann Hamill, and Julia C. Amos for their research assistance; Annette R.
Appell, Naomi R. Cahn, Joan Heifetz Hollinger, and Jane C. Murphy for their helpful
comments; and my own relatives Susanna and Amanda, as well as all adoptees, birth
parents, and adoptive parents who have shared their experiences of adoption.
1. RUTHENA HILL KITTSON, ORPHAN VOYAGE 51-52 (1968) (author also known as
Jean Paton).
2. Maud Morlock, Wanted: A Square Deal for the Baby Born Out of Wedlock, 10
CHILD 167, 168 (1946). The author was a consultant in Services for Unmarried Mothers, Social Service Division, U.S. Children's Bureau. [d. at 167.
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and accurate enough to properly inform the current debate over laws
that seal birth records from inspection by adult adoptees. Those unfamiliar with the subject often mistakenly assume that adoption has
always been a part of American law and that, in cases in which birth
parents and adoptive parents are strangers, the law has always kept
these parties' identities a secret from one another and has always
kept adoptees from learning the identity of their birth parents. Those
acquainted with the best informed sources understand, to the contrary, that adoption only became part of American law in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,3 and that adoption procedures initially established by state statutes provided neither for confidentiality with respect to the public nor for secrecy among the parties, but were subsequently amended to protect the parties from public scrutiny! The sources do not provide a clear picture, however, of
the ultimate development of the regime of secrecy among the parties.
Instead, they communicate a substantially flawed account, one that
conflates sealing original birth records from inspection by adult
adoptees with sealing court records from inspection by the parties
and sealing birth records from inspection by everyone except adult
adoptees. 6 Most sources misrepresent the timing and sequence of the
process by which all of these measures became nearly universal. This
3. A 1920 article reviewing the history and current status of adoption laws in the
United States noted that "adoption is now general, but it was not until the middle of
the nineteenth century that statutes changing the common law so as to permit it were
enacted, Massachusetts in 1851 being the first of the common law states so to legislate." John Francis Brosnan, The Law ofAdoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332,335 (1922).
"[B]y 1929 every state had enacted some type or"adoption legislation." DOROTHY ZIETZ,
CHILD WELFARE: PRINCIPLES AND METHODS 133 (1959). For other discussions of early
U.S. adoption laws, see Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern,
9 VAND. L. REv. 743 (1956); Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the
American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1971).
4. See, e.g., 2 JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE §
13.01[1] (2000).
5. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text. Accounts also tend to conflate
and confuse the subject of the sealing of court and birth records with the availability of
information in adoption agency records. Some states passed laws sealing the case records of public agencies, or of both public and private agencies, at the same time or at
a different time from the passage of laws concerning court or birth records, but other
states never passed laws concerning agency records. E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION 183-85 (1998). The history of the confidentiality of agency records is beyond the scope of this Article, although it is mentioned below in connection with discussion of reasons for closing original birth records to adult adoptees. That history is analyzed in a recent study by historian E. Wayne Carp, which is based on an exhaustive examination of contemporary
materials, including not only professional journals and the files of the U.S. Children's
Bureau and the Child Welfare League of America (a privately supported national organization), but also the annual reports and correspondence of child-placing agencies
in different states and the 21,500 adoption case records of the Children's Home Society
of Washington (a private agency founded in 1894). Id. at xi-xii.
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Article provides a new and more accurate account of the sealing of
birth records. It then uses that account to explore, in'a more nuanced
way than formerly possible, a complex relationship in this area between law and society, between legal rules on the one hand and social attitudes and understandings on the other. This exploration entails venturing into territory where certain, definite answers cannot
be found but where speculation is both possible and fruitful.
The widely accepted account of when adoptions in America became cloaked in secrecy goes something like this. Early in the twentieth century, states began moving toward protecting the privacy of
participants in the adoption process by closing court records to public
inspection. 6 Then, in the 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s, virtually all
states took the further step of imposing a unitary regime of secrecy
under which adopting parents and birth parents who were unknown
to one another would remain unknown and under which adult
adoptees could never learn the identity of their birth parents. 7 While
it is true that a small number of states closed original birth records
to adult adoptees at approximately the same time they otherwise
closed adoption records to the parties,8 most states proceeded much
more slowly with respect to adult adoptees' access to birth records. 9
In fact, as late as 1960, some forty percent of the states still had laws
on the books recognizing an unrestricted right of adult adoptees to
inspect their original birth certificates. 1o It was only in the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s that all but three of those states changed their laws
to close birth records to adoptees. l l At the same time that those states
6. See infra text accompanying note 26.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 26-34.
8. For example, New York, which may have been the first or one ofthe first states
to close original birth records to adult adoptees, as well as to other parties and the
public, see infra text accompanying notes 46-53, sealed court records in 1935 and
sealed original birth records in 1936. The court records law specified that "[tlhe written report of the investigation, together with all other papers pertaining to the adoption, shall be kept by the judge ... [andl must be sealed by him and withheld from inspection ... except upon an order of a court ... on good cause shown." 1935 N.Y. Laws
860. The birth records law specified that when a new birth record has been made,
"[tlhe commissioner of health shall place the original birth record and the proof, notification and papers pertaining to the new birth record under seal. Seals shall not be
broken except by order of a court .... " 1936 N.Y. Laws 854. A small number of states
sealed birth records from all inspection when court records were still available. Maryland, in 1939, provided that original birth records be sealed, and that "the seal not ...
be broken save by court order or by order of the Registrar for adequate reason." 1939
Md. Laws 620; see also John S. Strahorn, Jr., Adoption in Maryland, 7 MD. L. REV.
275,304 (1943). This was six years before Maryland sealed court records in 1945. See
1945 Md. Laws 343. California, Colorado, and Virginia also kept court records open
after sealing birth records. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 70-102 and accompanying text.
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were closing birth records, a growing national advocacy movement
for greater openness in adoption was encouraging many states to establish passive and active registries through which adult adoptees
and birth parents could attempt to seek information about and establish contact with one another.12
This Article relates how, in the 1940s and 1950s, a variety of ex. pert voices advised states to seal court and birth records but to recognize in adult adoptees an unrestricted right of access to the birth
records. 13 The reason given for the closing of court and birth records
to the parties as well as the public was to protect adoptive families
from possible interference by birth parents. In contrast, no reason
was generally offered in specific support of the closings of birth records to adult adoptees that did occur from the 1930s through the
1960s. 14 It appears that the early closings of birth records to adult
adoptees were not the result of articulated reasons, nor merely the
result of confusion or happenstance. The early closings may have
been, in no small part, the consequence of a contemporary social attitude or understanding, that is, of the social context in which they occurred. Adoption was beginning to be perceived as a means of creating a perfect and complete substitute for a family created by natural
childbirth. 15 Over time, as legal rules established a nearly universal
regime of secrecy with respect to all persons' access to court records
and all persons' except adult adoptees' access to birth records, the regime of secrecy itself inevitably influenced social attitudes and un12. With passive registers, adoptees and birth relatives may register their interest
in or willingness to exchange information or make contact. When a match occurs, the
parties are put in touch with one another. With active registries, also known as
"search and consent" systems, when one party registers, an intermediary undertakes a
search and, if possible, makes contact with a third party or third parties on behalf of
the registrant. More than twenty states have passive registry systems and more than
twenty-five have active ones, many of which also allow registrants to register in advance their willingness to have contact. See 2 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 4, at app.
13-A; Madelyn Freundlich, Open Records and Voluntary Registries, available at
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/policy/polrec.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2001); Provisions
for
Record
Access,
available
at
http://www.american-adoptioncong.org/aacprov.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2001) (defining terms used by different state
adoption systems); State Adoption Disclosure Laws at a Glance, available at
http://bastards.org/activism/access.htm (last modified Aug. 7, 2000). Efforts to establish a federal passive registry have been unsuccessful, see, e.g., Bill to Establish a National Voluntary Mutual Reunion Registry, S. 1487, 105th Congo (1997) (passed by the
Senate and referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means), and have proven
controversial among open records advocates, with some supporting and others opposing measures short of completely open records, see, e.g., Survey Says: Membership of
Two Minds on Federal Reunion Registry, GOOD CAUSE (Am. Adoption Cong., D.C.),
Fa!l1998, at 1, 1, 8 (stating that there was no consensus among members of group).
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.A.
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derstandings. Actions once thought natural, suc:tI as attempts by
adoptees to learn information about their birth families, came to be
socially disfavored and considered abnormal. Such attempts acquired
negative social meanings: they were the psychologically unhealthful
product of unsuccessful adoptions that had failed to create perfect
substitutes for natural families created by childbirth, and they indicated adoptees' rejection of and ingratitude toward adoptive parents. 16 Eventually, lifelong secrecy would be viewed as an essential
.feature of adoptions in which birth and adoptive parents did not
know one another.
Radical social change beginning in the 1960s as well as the
movement for greater openness in adoptions spearheaded by
adoptees, and to a lesser extent by birth parents, would come to
threaten societal acceptance of a closed and secretive adoption system. 17 Not surprisingly, efforts to preserve and reinforce lifelong secrecy emerged at the same time that the adoptees' rights movement
was leading states to move toward a somewhat greater degree of
openness via the use of registries. IS It was during this time that adult
adoptees' access to birth records was finally foreclosed in almost all
states and that a new understanding about such access became widespread. 19 The understanding focused on a perceived right to or guarantee of lifelong anonymity for birth parents, particularly birth
mothers, who had surrendered children for adoption.20 Adoptees' interest in birth families came to be seen as imperiling their birth parents' interests.
Today, this new understanding in turn is being challenged as we
are deluged with newspaper and magazine articles, television shows,
movies, and books that spotlight or refer to adoptee and birth parent
searches and reunions. 21 Nevertheless, perhaps due in considerable
part to the persistence of established social attitudes and understandings/2 only six states currently recognize the once universal
right of adult adoptees to unrestricted information about their ori-

16. See infra notes 257-71 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part IV.B.
18. See supra note 12 and infra notes 70-102 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part IV.B.
20. See infra notes 356-88, 411-12 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 336-39 and accompanying text. In addition, a proliferation of
websites and Internet resources facilitate, provide information about, and provide
links to information about adoptee and birth parent searches and reunions. See, e.g.,
The ALMA Society, at http://www.almanet.com;AmericanAdoptionCongress.at
http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org; Bastard Nation, at http://www.bastard.org;
I.S.R.R. (International Soundex Reunion Registry), at http://www.isrr.com; National
Adoption Information Clearinghouse, at http://www.calib.com/naic.
22. See infra Part IV.B.
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gins. 23 Two states have recognized a qualified right to access. 24 Seven
other states have recognized rights of access prospectively for future
adoptees, also qualified by birth parents' rights to prohibit access,
and a handful of states continue to permit access to, or have "reopened," records that were not sealed at the time they were created. 25
In Part II, this Article details the more accurate chronology of
the laws regulating adult adoptees' access to birth records. In Part
III, it presents a history of social and legal policies concerning such
access. In Part IV, the Article describes and analyzes both the evolution of social attitudes about access to birth records and the relation-

23. Those states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 26-lOA-31(g) (2000); 2000 Ala. Acts
794, Alaska, ALAsKA STAT. § 18.50.510 (LEXIS 2000), Kansas, RAN. STAT. ANN. § 652423 (Supp. 1999), Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 432.420 (1999); 1999 Ore. Laws 604 (upheld in Does v. Oregon, 993 P.2d 822 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)), South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-15.2 (LEXIS 1999), and Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-127
(1991).
24. In Delaware, birth parents wishing to block release of identifying information
may file a written veto that must be renewed every three years. If no veto is on file
when an adult adoptee requests the birth certificate, the state makes reasonable efforts to notify birth parents. If no veto is subsequently filed, the state releases the certificate sixty-five days after the request was made. The statute took effect in January
1999, and more than 100 birth certificates were issued during the first year. Two percent of affected birth parents have filed disclosure vetoes. Frederick F. Greenman,
TENOR: What We've Accomplished and What Lies Ahead, 16 DECREE (Am. Adoption
Cong.), No.4, at 1, 3 (1999). In Nebraska, adopted persons twenty-one years of age and
older have access to original birth certificates unless birth parents have signed notices
of non consent. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-146.04, .06 (Supp. 1997).
25. They are Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-5-305 (Supp. 2000) (providing disclosure vetoes by birth parents), Hawaii, HAw. REV. STAT. ANN § 578-15 (Michie 1997)
(providing affidavit by birth parents requesting confidentiality), Maryland, MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-3A-02 (1999) (providing nondisclosure vetoes by parents), Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-6-109 (1999) (providing disclosure vetoes by birth parents), Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-6.6(D) (West Supp. 2001) (providing
nondisclosure affidavits by biological parents), Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.33.345 (West 1997) (providing nondisclosure affidavits by birth parents), Vermont,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 6-105(b)(2) (Supp. 1999) (permitting birth parents to file requests for nondisclosure). In Virginia, with respect to post-July 1, 1994, executed consents in parental placement adoptions (independent, non-agency adoptions), the entire
court record is open to adoptive parents, adoptees at age eighteen, and the birth parents who executed the consents. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-219.54(E) (Michie 1995).
Colorado, Ohio, Maryland, and Montana continue to permit access to, or have "reopened," some older records that were not sealed at the time they were created, see
infra note 67 (records in Colorado adoptions concluded before 1967); Maryland (preJune 1, 1947), Md. Code Ann., Rule 9-112 (2001) (stating that court records not already sealed before June 1, 1947, may be sealed only by request of a party; however,
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 1O-616(b) (Supp 2000) states, "A custodian shall deny
inspection of public records that relate to the adoption of an individual."); Montana
(pre-1967), MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-109 (subject to birth parents' disclosure vetoes);
Ohio (pre-1964), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3705.12(A)(2)(c) (Anderson 1999) (making
adoption records available to the adopted person and adoptive parent).

2001]

THE IDEA OF ADOPTION

373

ship between those attitudes and the law.
II. CHRONOLOGY OF ADULT ADOPTEES' ACCESS TO BIRTH RECORDS
The leading legal treatise on adoption law conveys the impression that while the earliest twentieth century laws shielded adoption
proceedings only "from public scrutiny" rather than from the participants themselves, laws concerning court and birth records that were
passed from the 1920s through the 1950s provided "for the denial to
everyone of access to these records, except upon a judicial finding of
'good cause."'26 The treatise outlines New York's "fairly typical" experience in which all records were sealed by the late 1930s27 and reports that "[a] number of other states enacted legislation similar to
New York's sealed records statutes at about the same time. Others
passed similar statutes during the late 1940s or 1950s."28 The treatise
notes that some state laws allowed original birth certificates to be inspected "by anyone, including adult adoptees."29 It also reports that in
many states, "adoptees continued to have a legal right to inherit from
members of their biological family ... with the result that confidentiality at times yielded to the requirements of probate."3o
Other writers convey the general impression that ''by the middle
of this century, ... [a]lthough lawmakers initially enacted these secrecy provisions to protect the adoption triad from public exposure,
this protection evolved to create and maintain secrecy within the
triad: the birth family came to be entirely cut off from the adoptee
and the adoptive family."31 In a recent historical study of adoption
agencies' treatment of records, Family Matters: Secrecy and Disclosure in the History of Adoption, historian E. Wayne Carp discerned in
the first half of the century "a consensus both in policy and practice
of openness in disclosing information to those most intimately connected to adoption."32 By the middle of the century, however, "[b]y

26. 2 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 4, § 13.01[1].
27. Id. New York's early sealing of both court and original birth records was actually highly atypical. See supra note 8.
28. 2 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 4, § 13.01[1].
29. Id. The treatise identifies four of these states and refers to "other southern
states" in a footnote. It would be more accurate to say that many states permitted
adult adoptees to inspect the original birth certificates, and that some of them also
permitted adoptive parents or minor adoptees to do so. See infra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
30. 2 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 4, § 13.01[1]; see infra notes 169-79 and
accompanying text.
31. Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for
Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1005 (1995) (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis omitted); see also, e.g., Burton Z. Sokoloff, Antecedents of American
Adoption, FuTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 17, 21.
32. CARP, supra note 5, at 100.
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law, court proceedings of adoption and birth certificates had been
made confidential,"33 that is, they had been permanently closed to the
parties as well as the public. A recent sociological study of the current debate over sealed adoption records explains simply, "[b]y the
late 1940s, laws obliterating the adopted person's natal identity had
become the rule rather than the exception."34
In the mid-1920s, there were virtually no confidentiality or secrecy provisions in adoption law. In a 1925 report, the U.S. Children's Bureau described and appeared to endorse what little confidentiality existed for participants in the process with respect to public access to court records. The Bureau, which was established in
1912 within the Department of Commerce and Labor, conducted research, published reports and pamphlets, and was through the 1940s
"instrumental," according to historian Carp, "in reforming adoption
laws, instructing professional adoption workers, and educating the
American public on adoption issues."35 In its 1925 report, the Bureau
spoke approvingly of two states in which court records were open
only to the parties or by court order and of two additional states in
which records could be closed from inspection at the discretion of the
judge. 36 With respect to contact between birth and adoptive parents,
the report noted that while many states ordinarily required the presence in court of the birth parent or the guardian of the child to be
adopted, "the obligatory presence of a parent who has already recorded his consent may not be of advantage to the child or conducive
to the success of the new arrangement."37
By the mid-1930s to the early 1940s, there were more state provisions for confidentiality with respect to the general public's access
to court records, but still few provisions for secrecy among the participants. By the late 1930s, fewer than a third of the states38 accorded court records any degree of confidentiality; of those that did,

33. Id. (emphasis added). "[Tlhe intent of the law had been to exclude the public
and protect the privacy and self-esteem of adoptive parents and adoptees." Id.
34. KATARINA WEGAR, ADOPTION, IDENTITY, AND KINSHIP: THE DEBATE OVER
SEALED BIRTH RECORDS 25 (1997). Professors Naomi Cahn and Jana Singer provided a
richer and more subtle summary of the history of secrecy in adoption law, which drew
on Professor Carp's work and located in the 1960s "the transmu[tation of] traditional
confidentiality requirements into a regime of sealed records and secrecy which prevented all members of the adoption triad from accessing information." Naomi Cahn &
Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case for Opening Closed
Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150, 157 (1999).
35. CARP, supra note 5, at 22-23.
36. See EMILY FOSTER PECK, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ADOPTION LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES 19 (1925).
37. Id.
38. The term "states" in this Article and in the study discussed here includes the
states of the United States at the time in question and the District of Columbia.
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most permitted access to such records only to "parties in interest."
These parties would always include adoptive parents if not adoptees
as welp9 A 1935 summary of legislation on adoption reported a high
volume of legislation in the preceding decade, thirty-nine states having either "enacted new legislation or amended repeatedly their laws
upon the subject of adoption."40 As of 1935, six states provided access
to court records only to the parties or by court order; four states kept
the records of decree open to the public, but permitted the court to
withhold other court documents from inspection; and a single state
permitted access only by court order: 1 A survey of state adoption
statutes in 1938 reported ten states in which court records were
closed, except by court order, to all but the parties in interest; one
state in which reports of investigations filed with the court were subject to inspection only by court order; and one state where all records
except the decree could be withheld from inspection at the discretion
of the judge. It was in just three states that court records could be
opened only by court order:2 By 1943, however, it was reported that
more than half the states had provisions protecting court records
from public inspection, with access usually limited to "parties in interest" or "parties to the action,"43 the latter, at least, generally including only the adoptive parents or the adoptive parents and the
adopted child. 44
Court records, of course, may contain a variety of types of information about the parties in investigative reports as well as in pleadings and briefs and in testimony and other evidence, while birth certificates, although they vary from state to state and over time, in the
1930s through the 1950s usually contained only information such as
facts about the birth; the mother's name, maiden name, age, birthplace, address, and earlier pregnancies; the father's name, age,
birthplace, and occupation; whether the child was born to married
39. "Parties of record" or "parties to the action" would include the adopting parents
who file the adoption petition and would not include the birth parents, whose consents
or relinquishments are required in the action if their parental rights have not been
terminated. A state mayor may not consider the child, who is the subject of the petition, to be a party of record. See infra note 68. The concern that courts might consider
birth parents as "parties in interest" at one time prompted federal officials to recommend limiting access to "parties of record," in order to ensure that birth parents would
not have access. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
40. Carl A. Heisterman, A Summary of Legislation on Adoption, 9 Soc. SERVo REV.
269, 269 (1935).
41. See id. at 289.
42. See LEE M. BROOKS & EVELYN C. BROOKS, ADVENTURING IN ADOPfION 140-61
(1939). In one of the ten states in which court records were closed to all but the parties
in interest, the names of the adopters did not appear in the records. See id. at 161.
43. Comment, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59
YALE L.J. 715, 723 n.39 (1950) [hereinafter Moppets on the Marketl.
44. See supra note 39.
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parents; and the name of the person or persons who attended and
certified the birth.45 Before 1930, birth records were not amended
when a child was adopted. 46 During the 1930s states began to provide
for new birth certificates with the adoptive parents' names substituted for the birth parents' names. In 1935, Carl Heisterman's summary of legislation reported that a number of states required their
courts to notify state vital statistics officials of adoption decrees and
that five of those states provided for the issuance of a new birth certificate for adopted persons. No arrangements for sealing original
birth records were reported. 47 The 1938 survey reported that six
states simply required reports of adoptions to be made to vital statistics officials while another nine states provided for new birth certificates to be issued for adoptees. Among those nine states, one state
provided that copies of the original certificate were to be available
only to the child when of age or to the adoptive parents,48 and one
state allowed access only to "parties in interest."49 A 1939 book by a

45. These items of information are included among those recommended by the federal government to the states in all or in three of the four "standard certificates" forms
that were promulgated in 1930, 1939, 1949, and 1956. The standard certificates also
included an address for the certifier, who might or might not be the medical attendant
at the birth. Race of the parents was also to be recorded. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS: THE 1989 REVISION OF THE U.S. STANDARD CERTIFICATES AND REPORTS 18-19 (1991). With respect to what information was
to be provided on certified copies issued by a state, a government analyst explained in
a 1947 article that because "the birth certificate has become an integral part of our
everyday life," some states do and all states should provide copies with "only the facts
a person needs for a particular purpose and nothing more," excluding facts "never intended for public view. These include information about complications of pregnancy
and delivery, the results of the mother's test for syphilis, crippling conditions of the
infant, and illegitimacy." Helen C. Huffman, The Importance of Birth Records, 1947
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK 351 [hereinafter Huffman, Importance]; see
also Helen C. Huffman, A First Protection for the Child Born Out of Wedlock, 11
CHILD. 34, 34 (1947) [hereinafter Huffman, First]. The author was a social science analyst in the National Division of Vital Statistics, U.S. Department of Public Health Service. Huffman, First, supra, at 34.
46. See MARy RUTH COLBY, DEP'T OF LABOR, PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES IN
ADOPTION 120 (1941).
47. See Heisterman, supra note 40, at 288-89.
48. See COLBY, supra note 46, at 143. A 1961 amendment made clear that a certified copy of the original record could be issued, or inspection could be permitted, "upon
the specific written request of the adopted person, if over eighteen years of age, or of
an adopting parent of such person." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-53 (West 1972) (prior
to 1975 amendment). In earlier versions of the statute, the language was unclear, suggesting possibly that it was the new birth certificate, rather than the old one, that was
available to the adult adoptee and the adopting parents. See id.
49. COLBY, supra note 46, at 147. The survey overlooked the New York law that
provided for the issuance of new birth certificates and the sealing of original birth records, with the original birth records to be opened only by court order. See 1936 N.Y.
Laws 854; COLBY, supra note 46, at 120-21. The survey also did not report that Massa-
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social worker and a sociologist stated, without citation, that fifteen
states provided for amending birth certificates. 5o In a 1941 publication, the U.S. Children's Bureau agreed that "[t]he reporting of adoptions to the division responsible for recording vital statistics for the
purpose of changing the birth record is a relatively new procedure."51
It claimed, however, without citations to statutes or to secondary
sources, that about two-thirds of the states had enacted laws making
it possible to amend adopted children's birth records. 52 Of the seven
states the Bureau did identify, only three were said to seal original
birth records from public inspection, opening those records only upon
the demand of the child, upon the demand of his natural or adopting
parents, or by court order. 53
With respect to court records rather than birth records, contemporary evidence indicates that by the late 1940s and early 1950s a
significant, if not a dramatic, shift had occurred: court records by
that time were apparently closed in many states to all persons. For
original birth certificates, however, as more states began to provide
adoptees with new birth certificates, the provisions that were developing were apparently quite different, usually limiting access to the
public but not to the adult adoptee. In a 1948 volume "digesting the
adoption law and procedure of all states,"54 the author reported that
most states make court records secret and available only by court order and that "[iln most states, too, it is possible to obtain the issuance
of a new birth certificate in the new name of the adopted child. Generally, the old certificate will be sealed and filed, and will be opened
only upon request of the adopted person, if of legal age, or by an order of the court."55 A federal vital statistics official, in a 1947 article,
noted that "[n]early all states now prepare a new birth record for the
adopted or legitimated child, and only the details of this procedl,lre
still need to be improved." The article stressed the adoptee's "right to
a document linking his original and adoptive identities."56 It did not
mention that any state had foreclosed adult adoptee access to original records, although a few states had done SO.57 In 1953, at proceedchusetts and Pennsylvania provided new birth certificates, contrary to information in
the 1935 survey's tally, see Heisterman, supra note 40, at 288-89, but until 1938, Massachusetts law applied only to persons of illegitimate birth who acquired a new name
by judicial decree. COLBY, supra note 46, at 121.
50. See EDITH M.H. BAYLOR & ELIO D. MONACHESI, THE REHABILITATION OF CHIL·
OREN: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CHILD PLACEMENT 31 (1939).
51. COLBY, supra note 46, at 120.

52. Id.
53. Id. at 121.
MORTON L. LEAVY, Preface to LAw OF ADOPTION SIMPLIFIED (1948).
55. Id. at 18-19.
56. Huffman, Importance, supra note 45, at 356-57.
57. See id. For example, Hawaii (1945), see Bobbi W.Y. Lum, Priuacy u. Secrecy:

54.
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ings in which a draft of the Uniform Adoption Act was presented to
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
the committee chair expressed the view that the act's provision for
making adoption court records available only by court order was
commonplace and non-controversial and also that many states, as
recommended by the act, both provided for the issuance of new birth
certificates and permitted access by adult adoptees to original birth
records. 58 Approving these uniform law recommendations, a 1955
Iowa Law Review article described as "the prevailing modern view"
the provisions that court records were to be opened only by court order while original birth records could be inspected by adult
adoptees. 59
A significant shift in birth records policy had in fact occurred by
1960, the year every state reported its statutes and procedures in Digest of Statutory Provisions and Administrative Procedures for Adoption as Related to Birth Certificates. 6o Of the forty-nine reporting
states and the District of Columbia, twenty-eight reported that original birth records were available only by court order. 6 ! Wisconsin provided for inspection "at the discretion of the State registrar or upon
order of a court of competent jurisdiction," and New Hampshire "at
the discretion of the State registrar or the town clerk who has custody of the original birth record" or by court order. 62 But twenty
states, forty percent of all the jurisdictions, indicated that as of 1960,
original birth certificates could be inspected by adult adoptees and
otherwise by court order. 63 Four of the twenty states did not specify

The Open Adoption Records Movement and Its Impact on Hawaii, 15 U. HAw. L. REV.
483, 489-90 (1993), Maryland (1939), and New York (1936), see supra note 8, had foreclosed adult adoptee access to original records.
58. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
59. Maurice H. Merrill & Orpha A. Merrill, Toward Uniformity in Adoption Law,
40 IOWA L. REv. 299, 328 (1955) (approving the provisions of the Uniform Adoption Act
and the Uniform Vital Statistics Act, discussed infra at notes 118-25).
60. NAT'L OFFICE OF VITAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE,
DIGEST OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR ADOPTION
AS RELATED TO THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE (1960) [hereinafter ADOPTION DIGEST].
61. See id. Michigan's original birth records were effectively inaccessible because,
while they were available to anyone who knew the adoptee's name at birth, they were
not cross-referenced with the adoptee's new name. See id.
62. Id.
63. Those states were Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. See id. It is possible, of course, that practice may not always have been consistent with these laws, and
there is evidence of some confusion about the law in a small number of states. See infra notes 98-102, 272-84 and accompanying text. Whether a state recognizes adult
adoptee access to court and birth records is a different matter from the practices of
state social service agencies with respect to divulging information in their files. For
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that the adopted person had to be an adult in order to inspect the records. 64 Seven of the twenty states also permitted adoptive parents to
inspect the records. 65 Virginia, until 1977, permitted adult adoptee
access to court records but not to birth records. 66 In Colorado, court
records were available to the parties; however, these records were
closed to them in 1967. 67 In California, complete court records were
available to adoptive parents under a law that is still in effect but
that at present may be inconsistently applied. 66 Similarly, of course,
example, in Alabama at a time when the law provided for adult adoptee access to the
birth records, the State Department of Pensions and Security, according to a report of
a New York social worker, gave adult adoptees access "to all information about themselves except the names of their biological parents, which [could] be given only with
such parents' consent." Joel Freedman, An Adoptee in Search of Identity, 22 SOC.
WORK 227, 227 (1977). Upon request, the department would confer with the parents
and arrange a reunion. See id.
64. They were Alabama, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and Ohio. See ADOPTION DIGEST, supra note 60.
65. They were Alabama, Connecticut, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
and South Dakota. See id.
66. Virginia law provided that the files of adoption cases, "none of which shall be
exposed to public view but which shall be made available ... to persons and attorneys
having an interest in the subject matter ... and to such other persons as the court
shall direct in specific cases." VA. CODE ANN. § 63-359.1 (Michie 1949 & Supp. 1966).
The law also required that "[u]pon the entry of a final order of adoption, or other final
disposition of the matter, the clerk ... shall forthwith transmit to the Commissioner
all reports made in connection with the case." The file with the reports "shall not be
open to inspection, or be copied, by anyone other than the adopted child, if twenty -one
years of age and the adoptive parents, except upon the order of a circuit court entered
upon good cause shown." VA. CODE ANN. § 63-360 (Michie 1949 & Supp. 1966). A 1975
law review note reported that the records the adoptee could inspect "usually do not
identify the biological parents, although they do contain the adoptee's original name,"
citing a letter from an official of the Virginia Department of Welfare. Patricia Gallagher Lupack, Note, Sealed Records in Adoption: The Need for Legislative Reform, 21
CATH. LAW. 211, 214 n.22 (1975). The law was amended in 1977 to require a court order upon good cause shown for an adult adoptee to access "information with respect to
the identity of the biological family." 1977 Va. Acts ch. 556.
67. Colorado closed court records to public inspection in 1949. 1949 Colo. Sess.
Laws 211. In 1967, the legislature provided that records would be "open to inspection
only upon order of the court for good cause shown." 1967 Colo. Sess. Laws 1018. In
2000, the legislature partially re-opened pre-1967 records to the parties and provided
that original birth certificates, orders of relinquishment, and orders of termination of
parental rights in adoptions finalized after September 1, 1999, be open to inspection by
adult adoptees and adoptive parents of a minor adoptee, unless birth parents within
three years of the birth have provided the court with-and have not since withdrawna statement that the parents wished the identifying information to be kept confidential. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1-103(6.5), 19-5-305 (West Supp. 2000).
68. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9200(a) (West 1994). The law specifies that the "petition relinquishment or consent, agreement, order, report to the court from any investigating
agency, and any power of attorney and deposition" is open only to "the parties to the
proceeding and their attorneys and the department." Others must obtain a court order
based on findings of "exceptional circumstances" and "good cause approaching the ne-
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in all states in independent adoptions, at least the adoptive parents'
attorneys knew and had records that indicated the identity of birth
parents. 69
Of the twenty states in 1960 with laws that permitted adoptees
access on demand to original birth records, two-Alaska and Kansas-have never closed these records. 70 In South Dakota, both these
records and court records appear to have always been available on
demand, although it became necessary to make the demand to a
court and obtain a court order. 71 Of the remaining states, four
cessitous." Id. The parties to the proceeding are the adoptive parents. Telephone Interview with Karen R. Lane, California Adoption Law Practitioner and Member of the
American Academy of Adoption Attorneys (Dec. 19, 2000) (on file with author). A 1961
California intermediate appellate court decision noted that the "files are never closed
to the parties to the proceedings or their attorneys." Hubbard v. Superior Court, 189
Cal. App. 2d 741, 752 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). In that case, the attorney for the minor
adoptees had inspected the files and a third party had sought to inspect them. See id.
at 743. The national advocacy group Bastard Nation recently reported that
"[i]ndividual counties are given considerable freedom to interpret state adoption laws,
with the effect that a number of counties release virtually all court controlled adoption
records on demand of the adoptive parent and/or of the adult adoptee, with written
permission of the adoptive parents." State Adoption Disclosure Laws at a Glance, supra note 12.
69. See generally State Adoption Law at a Glance, supra note 12. In an independent or private, non-agency adoption, the adoptive parents' attorney files the papers
signed by the birth parent or parents giving consent or relinquishing parental rights.
70. See ALAsKA STAT. § 18.50.500 (LEXIS 2000); Op. Alaska Att'y Gen., No. 88386-0110, 1986 WL 81152, at *1 (June 5, 1986) (citing the long history of availability of
original birth certificates to adult adoptees); RAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423(a) (1992)
(permitting release of original birth records to adoptees). In Kansas, court records are
also open to "parties in interest," a term that does not include "genetic parents once a
decree of adoption is entered." RAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2122(a) (1994).
71. The practice in South Dakota at the present time is for adopted adults to petition a court, making a demand for access to both court and original birth records,
which is then granted by the court, according to the Adoption Program Specialist, Division of Child Protective Services, South Dakota Department of Social Services. See
Telephone Interview with DiAnn Kleinsasser (Oct. 18, 1999) (on file with author). Ms.
Kleinsasser ordinarily helps approximately ten adoptees a month fill out standard petition forms, except for periods in which television programs have appeared on the subject, during which she has handled a greater volume of inquiries. See id. South Dakota
statutes provide that court records are "not open to inspection or copy by persons other
than the parents by adoption and their attorneys, representatives of the department of
social services, and the child when he reaches maturity, except upon order of the
court." S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 25-6-15 (LEXIS 1999). A 1969 attorney general opinion
explained that under this provision, "the files and records of the court in an adoption
proceeding[] are open to inspection or copy by the adopted child when he reaches his
maturity, without a court order." 69 Op. S.D. Att'y Gen. 195 (1969). Birth records, on
the other hand, "may be opened only upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction, or
by the secretary of health for purposes of properly administering the vital registration
system." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-16.4 (Michie 1994). Non-identifying information
is available to adoptive parents or adult adoptees without court order, S.D. CODIFIED
LAws § 25-6-15.2 (LEXIS 1999), and a public registry is available to birth parents and
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changed these laws in the 1960s,72 six did not do so until the 1970s,73
and seven did so only after 1979.74 It is possible, of course, and not
inconsistent with the analysis offered below/5 that the practices of
states' superintendents of records were not always consistent with
state law during the period from 1960 until the law changed. In any
event, the fact that in 1960 forty percent of the states recognized a
right of access to original birth records is entirely consistent with the
historical context described below. 76
In 1961, shortly after the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare compiled its digest, Illinois sealed original birth records to
adult adoptees as well as to all others, making them "not ... subject
to inspection or certification except upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction."77 Two years later, in 1963, Ohio also closed original
birth records to adoptees, specifying that they could be opened only
upon a showing of good cause. 7B The next year, Georgia ended adult
adoptees' access to their original birth certificates, making the records "not ... subject to inspection except upon order of the superior
court."79 In 1966, the New Hampshire Attorney General's Office interpreted New Hampshire law as giving the state registrar the "authority and the duty" to direct town clerks not to cross-reference
original and new birth certificates, making it impossible to furnish
original records to adoptees who do not already know their original
surnames.S{) In 1967, Arizona repealed its statutory provision allowing adult adoptees to inspect their original birth records, instead allowing inspection only "upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction."Bl
Six more states changed their laws in the 1970s. In 1973, Nevada eliminated access by adult adoptees, allowing for opening origi-

adoptees, under which either may consent to the release to the other of the identifying
information, see id. § 25-6-15.3.
72. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
75. See infra Part N.
76. See infra Part III.
77. 1961 Ill. Laws 2943.
78. 1963 Ohio Laws 3107.14; New Birth Certificate Law for Adopted Children Ex·
plained by Dept. of Health, 38 OHIO B. 110, 112 (1965); Wendy L. Weiss, Note, Ohio
House Bill 419: Increased Openness in Adoption Records Law, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
101, 133 n.33 (1997). An Ohio law passed in the 1980s ore-opened" original birth records of persons whose adoptions were decreed prior to 1964, making such records
available on demand to adopting parents, adoptees, and lineal descendants of
adoptees. See OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. § 3705.12 (Anderson 2000).
79. 1964 Ga. Laws 88-1714.
80. lOp. N.H. Att'y Gen. 186 (1966).
81. 1967 Ariz. Sess. Laws 77 (repealing ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-326).
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nal birth records only upon an "order of the court issuing the adoption decree, expressly so permitting, pursuant to a petition setting
forth the reasons therefor [sic]."82 It was also in 1973 that Wyoming
closed these records to adult adoptees, requiring for inspection an
"order of a court of competent jurisdiction."83 In 1974, Massachusetts
eliminated the provision in its laws under which adoptees of any age
had a right to their original birth records, thereafter permitting release of information from the records "only upon receipt of an order of
the probate court."B4 In 1975, Connecticut moved to abolish access by
adult adoptees, requiring a court determination that inspection by
the petitioning adoptive parents, adult adoptee, or other person "will
not be detrimental to the public interest or to the welfare of the
adopted person or to the welfare of the natural or adopting parent or
parents."85 In 1975, North Dakota also eliminated adult access to
original birth records, providing that "they shall not be subject to inspection except upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction."86 In
1977, Louisiana ended adoptees' right to obtain upon demand a court
order opening their birth records. The state thereafter required that
there be "compelling reasons" and that the records be opened "only to
the extent necessary to satisfy such compelling necessity."87 (Also in
1977, Virginia amended its law so that adult adoptees would no
longer have automatic access to investigative reports used in adoption proceedings.)88
The largest number of legislative actions in this final chapter of
the story of closing birth records took place after 1979, when seven
more states closed birth records to adult adoptees. In 1979, in Montana, illegitimately born adopted persons could no longer have their
original birth records opened on demand, being required by an act
passed that year to apply to a court for disclosure. 89 In 1981, the law

82. NEV. REV. STAT. 440.310 (Michie 1973).
83. 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws 177.
84. 1974 Mass. Acts 546 (codified as amended at MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, §
13 (Law Co-op 1993)).
85. Sherry H. v. Probate Court, 411 A.2d 931, 934 (Conn. 1979) (citing 1975 Conn.
Pub. Acts 75-170). Court records were also available to adoptees over twenty-one and
adopting parents until 1974, when access was limited to the adoptive parents or to the
adoptee older than eighteen "for cause shown, either ex parte or with such notice the
court deems advisable." Other persons may have access "upon order of the court of
probate rendering the decree or any other court of competent jurisdiction." 1974 Conn.
Pub. Acts 74-164.
86. 1975 N.D. Laws 223.
87. Kirsch v. Parker, 383 So. 2d 384, 386 n.2 (La. 1980) (quoting LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40.81(A) (West 1997), as amended by 1977 La. Acts 659); Chambers v. Parker,
349 So. 2d 424, 425-26 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
88. See supra note 66.
89. 38 Op. Mont. Att'y Gen. 62 (1980).

2001]

THE IDEA OF ADOPTION

383

was amended to require that all adopted persons obtain a court order.oo In the meantime, in 1980, Florida had eliminated adult adoptee
access to original birth records, allowing "inspection only upon order
of the court."Ol In 1981, Utah changed its law permitting adult
adoptees access to original birth records, specifying that they "shall
not be open to inspection except upon the order of a court of competent jurisdiction."o2 Also in 1981, Wisconsin eliminated its provision
for inspection at the discretion of the state registrar. 03 In 1983, Idaho
amended a law under which original birth records could be "revealed"
to legitimated or adopted persons "if of age, [as well as their] parents
or the duly appointed legal representative of any of them, or upon
court order issued in the interest of justice."o4 The amendment removed adopted persons and their parents and representatives from
the provision so that thereafter access would be available only in
connection with concluded paternity determinations. o5 In 1984, Pennsylvania effectively repealed its provision allowing adopted adults
and adoptees' parents, guardians, or legal representatives access to
original birth records. o6 In Alabama, before 1990, not only were original birth records open to adult adoptees and adoptive parents, but
court records were also available as well to the parties in interest and
their attorneys. Alabama, in 1990, closed original birth records and
court records at the same time that it established a system for providing non-identifying information, and identifying information under certain circumstances, a system that included the appointment of
an intermediary to contact the natural parents on the adoptee's be-

90. 1981 Mont. Laws 228 (amending MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-15-304).
91. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-296 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 36.162).
92. 1981 Utah Laws 126 (enacting Utah Vital Statistics Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §
26-2-10 (2000».
93. 1981 Wis. Laws 359.
94. 1983 Idaho Sess. Laws 7. Idaho had before that date, and continues to have,
another provision under which original birth records may be inspected only upon court
order. That provision is evidently meant to apply only to public requests for inspection,
and to be read in conjunction with the more specific provision that formerly permitted
adopted adults and legitimated adults access, and that still permits the latter to have
access. IDAHO CODE § 39-257 (Michie 1993); ADOPTION DIGEST, supra note 60.
95. See IDAHO CODE § 39-257.
96. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 450.603(c) (West 1993); 1984 Pa. Laws 979; 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2905 (West Supp. 2000); 78 Op. Pa. Att'y Gen. 43 (1978) (asserting that the Division of Vital Statistics must make certified copies of original birth
certificates available to competent adult adoptees). The 1984 enactment repealed the
provisions allowing access "insofar as they are inconsistent with" a law making court
records available only upon court order "for good cause shown," or after a courtappointed or agency-appointed intermediary has obtained consent from the adoptees'
birth parents, or after the death of the birth parent about whom information is sought.
See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
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half.97
Oklahoma has been included here among the twenty states that
in 1960 reported laws providing adult adoptee access to original birth
records, although the meaning of Oklahoma's law is debatable. The
two statutory provisions the state referred to in its report to the federal government in 1960 had been passed at the same time, in 1957.
One provided that original birth records "may be opened by the State
Registrar only upon the demand of the adopted person, if of legal age,
or of the adoptive parents, by an order of the court."98 The other, pertaining to court records, provided that "[n]o person shall have access
to such records except upon order of the judge of the court in which
the decree of adoption was entered, for good cause shown.'>99 There is
no Oklahoma case law concerning the birth records provision or suggesting the practice of the courts over the years,100 although one legal
97. See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-32 (citing 1990 Ala. Acts 90-554); id. § 26-10-4 ; id. §
26-10A-31 (citing 1990 Ala. Acts 90-554); id. § 26-10-5. The law stated that nonidentifying information could be provided to adoptees when they reach the age of nineteen or to natural parents, and identifying information could be provided to adoptees
when they reach the age of nineteen if the natural mother or father, who may be contacted by a court-appointed intermediary if necessary, has consented to the release of
their identity, or if the court determines that the information should be released without consent. [d. In 2000, Alabama joined Tennessee and Oregon in re-opening birth
records to adult adoptees. See supra note 23.
98. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.18(2) (current version at title 10, section
7505.6.6 by 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws 366). The state paraphrased this section as, "the
original birth record and any other document pertinent to the case may be inspected
by the adopted person, if of legal age, or by the adoptive parents. In either case, a court
order must first be obtained from a court of competent jurisdiction." Adoption Digest,
supra note 60.
99. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.17(B) (current version at title 10, section
7505.6.6 by 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws 366). Neither a vital statistics provision passed in
1963 nor an attorney general's opinion issued in 1982 settled the question of whether
the court order required by the 1963 law to inspect birth records was to be available on
demand. The 1963 vital statistics law states that the original birth certificate "shall
not be subject to inspection except upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction or as
otherwise specifically provided by law," OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-316 (West 1998),
and the attorney general's opinion simply stated that "[a]dopted persons of legal age
demanding to view their original birth certificate must, under the provisions of 10 O.S.
1971, § 60.18, obtain a court order." 14 Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 204 (1982). The attorney
general's opinion was based on the language of the statute, "by an order of the court,"
and the fact that this requirement was "in conformity with" the provisions of the court
records law, which withheld court records from inspection "except upon order of the
court for good cause shown." [d. (citations omitted). The author of the opinion, then an
assistant attorney general and deputy chief of the civil division and now a senior assistant attorney general, said in an interview that the opinion indicated the two provisions were "not irreconcilable," but that the opinion did not address the question of
whether the court had any discretion when adult adoptees make demands to the court
for an order permitting them to inspect birth records. See Telephone Interview with
Neal Leader (Dec. 10, 1999) (on file with author).
100. In a 1980 district court case concerning an adoptee's access to state welfare
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commentator in 1973 reported that a public welfare official indicated
that state law was being interpreted as a "sealed records statute. mOl
The birth records provision was amended in 1997 to exclude access
upon demand. lo2 It seems likely that the legislature in 1957 intended
to recognize a right of adoptive parents and adult adoptees to obtain
a court order upon demand. This interpretation is supported by the
plain language, that is, the use in the birth records provision of the
words "upon demand"; by the difference between the language used
in the birth and the court records provisions; and by the historical
context described below.
III. SOCIAL POLICIES AND ADOPTEES' ACCESS TO BIRTH RECORDS

When one searches the historical record from the 1930s through
the 1960s to understand how and why the adoption process became
cloaked in secrecy-specifically why court records in most states
came to be closed to all, and birth records in many states came to be
closed even to adult adoptees-one finds through the 1950s a chorus
of influential, authoritative voices supporting the complete closure of
court records while recommending that original birth records remain
available to adult adoptees. More generally, throughout the entire
period, one finds that the reasons proffered for confidentiality and secrecy focus solely on protecting adoptees from embarrassing disclosure of the circumstances of their births and on protecting adoptive
parents and their adoptive children from being interfered with or
harassed by birth parents, as it was believed they might be if birth
parents and adoptive parents who were unknown to one another
were to learn one another's identity. Among the legal, social service,
and other social science commentators, there appears to be no or virtually no discussion of a need to protect birth parents from adult
adoptees seeking and acquiring information about their birth families.
The U.S. Children's Bureau, one of the most influential actors in

department records, the court construed Oklahoma's welfare records law as providing
that the department's adoption records, like court records, were only subject to disclosure upon a showing of good cause. See Schechter v. Boren, 535 F. Supp. 1, 3 (W.D.
Okla. 1980). Comparing Oklahoma and New York closed adoption records laws, the
district court stated that Oklahoma law provides "for the sealing of records pertaining
to an adoption unless 'good cause' is shown," but the court did not cite or consider the
state's birth records provision. See id. The adoptee who sought the welfare department
records had already obtained information, including the identity of her birth mother,
in a "'good cause' proceeding" under the state's court records provision. [d. at 4.
101. Barbara Prager & Stanley A. Rothstein, Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His
Natural Heritage, 19 N.Y. L.F. 137, 138 n.5 (1973) (citing a letter to Prager from the
Director ofInstitutions, Social and Rehabilitation Services, Department of Public Welfare, State of Oklahoma).
102. 1997 Okla Sess. Laws 366.
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the development of adoption law in the mid-twentieth century/03
stressed in the 1940s and 1950s the desirability of shielding both
court records and original birth records from public inspection to protect the parties from public disclosure of personal information in the
court records and, particularly, to protect adoptees from public disclosure of information that might indicate their birth parents were
not married. The' Bureau also advised that birth parents and adoptive parents should not have access to information about one another,
in order to avoid the danger of the child and the adoptive parents being intruded upon by the birth parents. While urging that original
birth records be sealed from public inspection, the Bureau specifically
recommended that they should be available to adult adoptees. In
1941, the Children's Bureau published a study of adoption procedures in selected states in part to "furnish a basis for evaluating [existing] laws and for determining which aspects of the legislation now
in operation could safely be recommended to other States."104 The
study spoke approvingly of a trend toward closing the court records of
adoption proceedings to public inspection, noting that "parties in interest," who are generally permitted access to the records, might better be termed "parties of record" to ensure that birth parents whose
rights have been terminated would not have access.105 The suggestion
was that "harm may be done" if "such a parent learn[s] the whereabouts of the child after adoption."106 A Children's Bureau spokeswoman similarly warned in a 1945 social work journal: "The child
should ... be protected from ... interference of his natural parents
after he has been happily established in his adoptive home."107 The
report of a Bureau-sponsored conference in 1955 explained again the
"desirable protection[]" that "the child not be disturbed by having two
sets of parents," a situation that could be prevented by "placement of
the child in such a way that the natural parents do not know where
the child is placed."loB
With respect to birth records, the Children's Bureau's 1941 study
also approved of laws enacted after 1930 making it possible to amend
the birth record of an adopted child "so that he may be spared the

103. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
COLBY, supra note 46, at 1.
105. See id. at 118-20.
106. [d.; see also Mary Ruth Colby, Modern Safeguards in Adoption Legislation,

104.

CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE AM. BULL., Dec. 1941, at 3, 5.
107. Maud Morlock, Babies on the Market, SURVEY MIDMONTHLY, Mar. 1945, at 67,
67 (emphasis omitted). She also wrote that adoptive parents "should be protected
from ... later disturbance of their relationship to [the child] by natural parents." [d. at

68.
108. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PROTECTING
CHILDREN IN ADOPTION 13 (1955) [hereinafter PROTECTING CHILDREN].
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embarrassment of explaining why his own name and the names of
the parents are not the same as the names on his birth record."109 The
study described laws under which the original certificates were
sealed and could be opened only upon the demand of the child himself, or upon the demand of his natural or adoptive parents, or by order of a court. The study reported the suggestion that a certificate of
adoption might be preferable to a new certificate "since the child was
not actually born to the adopting parents as the amended birth record implies." Mter this certificate of adoption was issued, the original birth record "would be sealed and opened only on request of the
child or his representative or on order of a court."IlO Whatever form
the substitute document should take, there was no suggestion in the
study that creating the new certificate and sealing the old one was
for the purpose of concealing the identity of the birth parents from
the adult adoptee. The purpose was to spare the adoptee "the embarrassment of having a birth certificate which gives information of the
circumstances of his birth when only proof of age and place of birth
are necessary."lll As a Bureau analyst concluded in 1946, "[f]or the
protection of the adopted child[,] . " [i]t is necessary. .. that the
original certificate and the report from the court ... be opened only
upon court order, or upon request of the adopted person when of
age."1l2 This position was consonant with the earlier history of Progressive Era reformers who had sought to protect mothers and children from the stigma of the children's illegitimacy by making birth
records confidential but who had never intended "to prevent children
born out of wedlock, or adopted children, from viewing their own
birth records."113
In a 1949 publication, the Children's Bureau failed to mention
any concern with birth parents' privacy as a reason for sealing records and specifically endorsed adult adoptee access to original birth
certificates. With regard to the reasons otherwise supporting sealing
original birth records, the Bureau again cited only the importance of
shielding the adoptee from the disclosure of embarrassing information. In one of two publications issued that year, the Bureau noted
the importance of complete and accurate vital statistics records, facilitated by the forwarding of decrees of adoption to the state registrar of vital statistics. Without this information, it was explained:
[I]t is impossible for [the registrar] to give the adopted child the in-

formation that ties in the details on his original birth record with
his new name and status under the adoption decree. Moreover, in
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

COLBY, supra note 46, at 120.
[d. at 121.
[d. at 122.
Huffman, First, supra note 45, at 36.
CARP, supra note 5, at 49.

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

388

[Vol. 53:367

later life accurate and complete records will enable him to establish
his true identity if occasion arises. 114

In a joint publication with the American Association of Registration
Executives' Council on Vital Records and Statistics, which recommended and endorsed birth records policies, the Bureau counseled
that amendatory birth records should be prepared after decrees of
adoption and legitimization, but it emphasized that "[i]t is very important that the child's original birth certificate be identified so that
his complete birth record will be available to him when needed."115
"The right to inspect or to secure a certified copy of the original birth
certificate of an adopted child should be restricted to the [adoptee], if
of legal age; or upon court order."116 Again, the reasons given for sealing the original records from public inspection were that "[i]n many
cases, the original certificate will show that the child was born out of
wedlock or that its parents are unknown. It is desirable, also, that
the natural parents and adopting parents should remain unknown to
each other."117
These separate and quite different court records and birth records policies, recommended by the Bureau and by vital statistics
professionals, were also disseminated in the 1940s and the early
1950s in two model statutes, the Uniform Vital Statistics Act of
1942 118 and the first Uniform Adoption Act, published in 1953.119 With
respect to court records, the Uniform Adoption Act provided that
hearings would be held in closed courts and court records would be
sealed: 120 "All papers and records pertaining to the adoption shall be
kept as a permanent record of the court and withheld from inspection ... except on order of the judge of the court in which the decree
of adoption was entered for good cause shown."121 At proceedings presenting the uniform act, these provisions were described by the
chairman of the committee as ones concerning "the non-controversial
subject of the confidential nature of the record and the proceedings."122 With respect to birth records, the 1953 Uniform Adoption Act
114. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, Soc. SEC. ADMIN., ESSENTIALS OF ADOPTION LAw AND
PROCEDURE 23 (1949).
115. CHILDREN'S BUREAU & NAT'L OFFICE OF VITAL STATISTICS, THE CONFIDENTIAL
NATURE OF BIRTH RECORDS 6 (1949).

116. Id. at 7.
117. Id.
118. UNIF. VITAL STAT. ACT (1942), reprinted in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws AND PROCEEDINGS (1942) [hereinafter 1942 HANDBOOK].
119. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1953), reprinted in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws AND PROCEEDINGS (1953).
120. Id. § 13(1).
121.

Id. § 13(2).

122.

NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, PROCEEDINGS IN COMMITTEE
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provided that the original birth certificate and a copy of the decree,
which were to be sealed by the state registrar after a new certificate
was prepared, "may be opened by the state registrar only upon the
demand of the adopted person if of legal age or by an order of
court.m23 The comment to this provision explained that the provision
could be omitted in those states that have already adopted it as part
of the Uniform Vital Statistics Act of 1942.124 At proceedings presenting the Act, it was noted that "[a] good many states do have it. It is
only in the rare occasion where that is not true that this Section
adopts that part ofthe Uniform Vital Statistics Act."125
In 1959, the Model State Vital Statistics Act changed course
without explanatory comment. The 1959 revision of and successor to
the 1942 Act included an amended provision under which "the original certificate and the evidence of adoption, paternity, or legitimation
shall not be subject to inspection except upon order of (a court of
competent jurisdiction).m26 Although the Children's Bureau incorporated this provision in a 1961 legislative guide, the Bureau continued
to counsel that old and new birth records be cross-referenced so the
registrar could "give the adopted child the information that ties in
the details on his original birth record with his new name and status
under the adoption decree .... [I]n later life accurate and complete
records will enable him to establish his true identity if occasion
arises."127
OF THE WHOLE UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT 307 [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS].
123. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 14(2) (1953).
124. See id. § 14 cmt. (citing the UNIF. VITAL STAT. ACT, §§ 24, 35 (1942».
125. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 122, at 309.
126. NAT'L OFFICE OF VITAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE,
MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT: 1959 REVISION § 17(b)(1) (1960). The provision
continues, as do a number of similar state provisions, "or as provided by regulation."
[d. Such language about regulations in these statutes refers to provisions under which
information may be released to other governmental agencies rather than to members
of the public. The first model vital statistics act was produced in 1907 by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. See James A. Weed, Vital Statistics in the United States: Preparing
for the Next Century, 61 POPULATION INDEX 527 (1995), available at
http://popindex.princeton.edu/current_items/Weed/Weed.html (last modified Nov. 19,
1998). The second model act was initially drafted by the Bureau of the Census in 1939
and then presented to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. 1942 HANDBOOK, supra note 118, at 187. The Conference and the American Bar
Association approved a revised version in 1942. [d. at 188. In 1946, responsibility for
vital statistics was transferred from the U.s. Census Bureau to the U.S. Public Health
Service's National Office of Vital Statistics. Weed, supra. The Office of Vital Statistics
produced the 1959 revision. See MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT: 1959 REVISION,
supra. In 1960, responsibility was transferred within the Public Health Service to the
National Center for Health Statistics, which produced revised model acts in 1977 and
1992. Weed,supra.
127. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE
GUIDES FOR THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE
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When the Uniform Adoption Act was revised in 1969, it included
a provision similar to the 1953 Act's provision requiring the clerk of
the court to forward information to the appropriate vital statistics office,128 but it omitted altogether the provision that required the sealing of the original birth certificate while allowing it to be inspected
upon demand by an adult adoptee. 129 In other words, the 1969 Uniform Adoption Act omitted altogether the subject of access to original
birth records by adult adoptees. There was a hint in a provision of
the 1969 Act added in 1971 that disclosure of information perhaps
should be within the discretion of the adoptive parents or the older
adopted child. The provision was added in response to a 1969 New
York case, a habeas corpus proceeding brought to obtain custody of a
child, in which the trial judge ordered the attorney for the adoptive
parents to disclose the identity of his clients. 13o The provision stated
that "except as authorized in writing by the adoptive parent, the
adopted child, if 14 or more years of age, or upon order of the court
for good cause shown in exceptional cases, no person is required to
disclose the name or identity of either an adoptive parent or an
adopted child."131 It was not until its 1994 revision that the Uniform
Adoption Act included a provision for sealing original birth records
from adult adoptees, specifically for sealing the records for ninetynine years and making them available during that period only by
court order 132 or upon request of adult adoptees who "furnished a consent to disclosure signed by each individual who was named as a
parent on the ... original birth certificate."133
Another influential national organization, the private Child Welfare League of America, never affirmatively recommended that original birth records be available to adult adoptees. The League, founded
in 1921 with sixty-five organizations as charter members, quickly became "the most important private national agency for child welfare."134 In 1958, it recommended both that court records "should be
sealed and should not be open to inspection except on court order"135
and that after a new birth certificate was issued, "[t]he original certificate should then be sealed."136 Throughout the 1940s and 1950s,

ADOPTION OF CHILDREN 29-30, 57 (1961).
128. Cf UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 14 (1953) with UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 18 (1969).
129. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 18 (1969).
130. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 298 N.Y.S.2d 345, 347 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
131. REVISED UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 16(3) (1969) (amended 1971).
132. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 6-107, 9 U.L.A. 11 (1994).
133. [d. § 6-107(a).
134. CARP, supra note 5, at 45.
135. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE 60 (1959)
[hereinafter 1958 STANDARDS].
136. [d. at 64.
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however, the League gave as the reasons for confidentiality and secrecy only the need to keep adoptive and birth parents from knowing
one another's identity and the need to protect adoptees and adoptive
parents from the dangers of public access to personal information.
In the League's 1941 Standards for Children's Organizations
Providing Foster Family Care, a section on adoption included among
"[t]he safeguards that the adopting family should expect ... [t]hat
the identity of the adopting parents should be kept from the natural
parents" and "[t]hat the adoption proceedings be completed without
unnecessary publicity."137 Safeguards for the state's and the child's
protection included "[t]hat the birth records of an adopted child be so
revised as to shield him from unnecessary embarrassment in case of
illegitimacy."l38 The League, in a 1959 publication, similarly counseled agencies to protect adoptive parents by assuring them that
"natural parents will not know with whom the child is placed.»l39
With respect to the "relation of the court and adoption services," it
advised that "[h]earings on adoption should be closed to the public.
The identity of the natural and adoptive parents should be protected
from each other."14o The League did not advise agencies to give birth
parents assurances of lifelong anonymity; rather agencies were to be
sure that birth parents had "a full awareness of the implications ....
It should be understood that all ties are to be permanently severed
with the [adoption] of the child. m41
In connection with the League's 1959 recommendation that
original birth certificates ''be sealed," the League's standards noted
the desirability of "protect[ing] individuals from possible embarrassment in revealing that they were born out of wedlock, or that one
parent happened to be in an institution when the child was born."142
With respect to the retention of case records, the standards stated
that records "should preserve information about the child and his
family which can be made available when needed.»l43 Elsewhere, the
standards advised agencies to be prepared to offer follow-up services
after the adoption: "In cases in which children or parents return for
information or assistance, the agency should find out about the situation and give help with concerns related specifically to adoption, as

137. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., STANDARDS FOR CHILDREN'S ORGANIZATIONS
PROVIDING FOSTER FAMILY CARE 36 (1941) [hereinafter FOSTER FAMILY CARE STANDARDS].

138. Id.
139.

1958 STANDARDS, supra

note 135, at 31.

140. Id. at 59-60.

note 137, at 35.
note 135, at 64-65.

141.

FOSTER FAMILY CARE STANDARDS, supra

142.

1958 STANDARDS, supra
Id. at 47.

143.
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for example a child's request to know about his natural parents. m44
One would expect to find in secondary legal authorities from the
1920s through the 1960s prescriptions for and critiques of changes in
adoption law, for this was a period of rapid and frequent changes in
the law. Between 1925 and 1935 alone, one report noted that "39
states enacted new adoption laws or amended existing legislation to
reflect in whole or in part the recommendations made by the Children's Bureau. m45 Between 1940 and 1945, it was reported that "forty
states ... improved their adoption legislation."146 A 1951 report from
a Child Welfare League workshop reported that "since 1948 we find
that half the states have amended their adoption laws. Seven states
have re-enacted their adoption laws and in this brief period one state
has done so for the second time. m47
Among law reviews and bar journals published from the 1920s
through the 1960s, there are numerous commentaries on adoption
laws. A survey of most of those articles, however, revealed relatively
little about confidentiality and secrecy in the adoption process. The
most frequently addressed subjects are inheritance,148 independent
adoptions,149 and ''black market" adoptions. 15o There are also general
reviews of state laws and procedures/51 and articles on a wide smattering of other topics. 152 When articles do touch on the subject of se144. Id. at 30.
145. ZIETZ, supra note 3, at 133.
146. Morlock, supra note 107, at 68.
147. Child Welfare League of Am., Adoption Practices, Procedures and Problems: A
Report of the Second Workshop Held in New York City May 10,12,1951, at 16 (1951).
148. See, e.g., supra notes 169-79 and accompanying text. This is by far the most
frequently addressed topic through the 1960s.
149. An independent placement is one in which a child is placed in the adoptive
home by parents, friends, relatives, physicians, lawyers, or others without
the aid of a recognized child-placing agency. An "agency placement" is one in
which a child is relinquished by his own parent or parents to a licensed childplacing agency with the agency assuming responsibility for the child's interim care and for the selection of the child's new and permanent legal family.
DOROTHY ZIETZ, CHILD WELFARE: SERVICES AND PERSPECTIVES 104-05 (1969) (citing
CAL. STATE DEP'T OF SOC. WELFARE, ADOPTING A CHILD IN CALIFORNIA 3 (1968».
150. See, e.g., Philip B. Gilliam, The 1951 Amendments to the Relinquishment and
Adoption Laws, 28 DICTA 227 (1951); Robert Taft, Jr., Some Problems Under The
Adoption Laws of Ohio, 13 OHIO ST. L.J. 48 (1952); Jacobus TenBroek, California's
Adoption Law and Programs, 6 HASTINGS L.J. 261 (1955); Moppets on the Market, suo
pra note 43.
151. See, e.g., Julian Bamberger, Adoption in Indiana, 17 IND. L.J. 225 (1942);
Eugene M. Haertle, Wisconsin Adoption Law and Procedure, 33 MARQ. L. REV. 37
(1949); Rush H. Limbaugh, The Adoption of Children in Missouri, 2 MO. L. REV. 300
(1937); Curt Charles Silberman, Adoption in New Jersey-An Analysis of Its Legal Effects and Consequences, 1 RUTGERS L. REV. 250 (1947).
152. See, e.g., Charles H. Miller, The Lawyer's Place in Adoptions, 21 TENN. L. REV.
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crecy provisions, authors consistently cite the need to prevent adoptive and natural parents who are unknown to one another from
learning one another's identity, in order to protect adoptive parents
and adopted children from the possible danger of interfering or harassing natural parents. There appear to be no suggestions of a need
on the part of birth parents to be protected against later discovery by
adoptees. In a comprehensive 1950 Yale Law Journal comment on
adoption regulation, the author discussed one danger of independently arranged versus agency-mediated adoptions: "Since the identities of natural and adoptive parents are seldom concealed from one
another, adoptive parents are frequently harassed by a mother who
has changed her mind and wants her child back.>H53 A comment in
1951 on new Texas legislation explained approvingly that under new
procedures for giving consent to adoption, it "is now possible for the
identity of the adopted parents to be concealed from the natural parents and for the identity of the natural parents to be concealed from
the adopted parents, when the child is adopted through a licensed
placement agency.>H54 A report about and analysis of Pennsylvania's
1954 legislation opined in the same vein that "[i]t is agreed that it is
best for all parties if the natural parent does not know the identity of
the adoptive parents."155 Therefore, a statutory provision for giving
consent outside of and before the adoption hearing has the favorable
result that "the adoptive parents need no longer fear subsequent contacts with the natural parent."156 Another commentary on the same
legislation concurred: "A family adopting a child released under such
circumstances has the safeguard of a guarantee that in the future the
natural parents cannot disturb their happiness by the assertion of
any rights in the child."157 In a 1955 Iowa Law Review symposium issue on adoption, one of the authors wrote that "[w]hen the natural
parents do not know where the child is placed, it seems inadvisable
to permit them to secure that information."158 He also commented,
"[i]t is unfortunate that sometimes [birth] parents appear to be prom630 (1951); Joseph W. Newbold, Jurisdictional and Social Aspects of Adoption, 11
MINN. L. REv. 605 (1927) (judicial interpretation of adoption laws, and jurisdiction);
Paul Ramsey, The Legal Imputation of Religion to an Infant in Adoption Proceedings,
34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 649 (1959); Walter Wadlington, The Divorced Parent and Consent
for Adoption, 36 U. eIN. L. REV. 196 (1967).
153. Moppets on the Market, supra note 43, at 724.
154. William H. Borchers, Recent Statute, Texas Adoption Statute-Amendments to
Articles 46A and 46B, 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 117, 119 (1951).
155. Note, Improving the Adoption Process: The Pennsylvania Adoption Act, 102 U.
PA. L. REV. 759, 770 (1954).
156. Id. at 771.
157. Edward Goldman, Legislation, Adoption: New Law, New Problems, 59 DICK. L.
REV. 57, 59 (1954).
158. Harvey Uhlenhopp, Adoption in Iowa, 40 IOWA L. REV. 228, 282 n.228 (1955).
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ised that they may visit children when they consent to the adoption.
This is a practice which no respectable agency would countenance."159
On the other hand, a 1955 article on California law approved of a
procedure in independent adoptions under which a natural parent
may see the names of the adopters because the procedure may prevent "black market evils"; but, the article noted, this procedure "embodies what otherwise is regarded as a bad practice.»l60 A 1956 Los
Angeles Bar Association report on California law expressed a somewhat contrary view, suggesting it would be sufficient if the natural
mother knew everything she wanted to know about the adopting parents except identifying information because "it is better for the child,
better for the adopting parents, and better for the natural mother if
she does not know the names, address and telephone number of the
adopting parents." 161 If she insists, the report concluded, she should
have a right to this information but the adopting parents should
know that their identity would be disclosed. 162
A decade later, a law review comment on inheritance rights explained that anonymity was needed to "protect the adoptive parents
from the possibility of harassment by the natural parents who may
seek return of their child."i63 The purpose "is to effect a complete emotional break between the child and the natural parents ... [and it]
tends to lessen the fears on the part of the adoptive parent that the
natural parents will attempt to take the child away from them."i64
Similarly, in a 1969 review of adoption law throughout the nation,
the chair of the American Bar Association Family Law Section's
Committee on Adoption articulated as the rationale for secrecy in
adoption the protection of "the adopted child and his adoptive parents from possible harassment and invasions of privacy."165 The chair
continued, suggesting just how far some states were going to protect
against this possible harassment: "Indeed, under many statutes;
adoptive parents are not allowed to discover the real identity of the
child they adopted through an authorized adoption agency."166 In New
York, a highly atypical jurisdiction with regard to how early it had
159. Id. (citing Note, Enforcement of Pre·Adoption Promises to Allow Post·Adoption
Visitation of Child by Natural Parents, 16 IOWA L. REV. 538, 540 (1931)).
160. TenBroek, supra note 150, at 340.
161. L.A. Bar Ass'n, Report and Recommendations of the Association's 1955 Special
Committee on Adoptions, Concerning Anonymity of Adopting Parents, 31 L.A. BAR
AsS'N BULL. 327, 327·28 (1956).
162. Id.
163. Paul A. Kiefer, Comment, Intestate Succession, Sociology and the Adopted
Child, 11 VILL. L. REV. 392, 394·95 (1966).
164. Id. at 395.
165. Felix Infausto, Annual Review of Decisions and Statutory Revisions Affecting
Adoptions, 3 FAM. L.Q. 123, 137 (1969).
166. Id.

2001]

THE IDEA OF ADOPTION

395

closed court and birth records to all,167 it was not until 1968 that the
legislature took steps to ensure that in agency adoptions adoptive
parents could not learn the surname of the child. 16B
One related area of adoption law that was discussed frequently
in legal periodicals was inheritance by and through adopted children,169 no doubt because it involves contests over property. The discussions of inheritance suggest that through the 1960s, the laws of
many states, while providing for natural parents and adoptive parents to remain unknown to one another, did not necessarily contemplate a total legal separation between adopted children and their
birth relatives. Before 1935, adopted children were permitted to inherit from their adoptive parents, although they were generally unable to inherit from relatives of the adoptive parents. Adopted children were usually permitted to inherit from their birth parents as
well as from other birth relatives. 17o Only modest changes had occurred by 1943 when a survey of the law concluded that "there is still
a reluctance to permit the adoptee to inherit from the adoptor's relatives. It is . . . possible to discern the beginning of a movement to
deny the child's right to inherit from the natural parents .... "171 It
was reported then that five states expressly denied adoptees the
right to inherit from natural parents, twelve states expressly permitted them to, and in the thirty-two states without statutory provisions, "[t]he generally applicable rule is that the adoption should not
be held to deprive the adoptee of the right to inherit from natural

167. See supra notes 8, 36-59 and accompanying text.
168. See 1968 N.Y. Laws 2951 (amending adoption relations law).
169... See, e.g., Bamberger, supra note 151, at 233-35; Emilio S. Binavince, Adoption
and the Law of Descent and Distribution: A Comparative Study and a Proposal for
Model Legislation, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 152 (1966); Limbaugh, supra note 151, at 311-12;
Silberman, supra note 151, at 275-81; Recent Decision, Descents and DistributionsNatural Mother of Adopted Child Preferred to Father of Adoptive Parents, 12 VA. L.
REv. 511 (1926); Note, Inheritance by Adopted Child in Dual Capacity, 41 ILL. L. REV.
466 (1946); Donald F. Pierce, Comment, Inheritance by, Through, and from an Adopted
Child, 9 ALA. L. REV. 35 (1956).
170. See Pierce, supra note 169, at 36. In addition:
Provisions for inheritance from the child by the adoptive parents and their
kindred were found in thirty-two jurisdictions. The general tendency of the
courts, in the absence of an express denial of the right of inheritance, was to
allow the adoptive parents to inherit, limiting the property they took to that
which the child acquired from or through them. Natural parents and kin
were denied the right to inherit from the child in four jurisdictions. They
were usually allowed to inherit in all others. Property received by the child,
after his adoption, was normally excepted from inheritance by the natural
kin.
Id.
171. Fred L. Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession by and from the Adopted Child, 28
WASH. U. L.Q. 221, 232 (1943).
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relatives."172
By 1956, seven states were said to be following the provision of
the Model Probate Code of 1946, under which adopted children, for
inheritance purposes, are treated as if they are the natural children
of their adoptive parents and are no longer considered the children of
their natural parents. 173 However, recent legislation was also reported in another seven states under which adopted children retained the right to inherit from natural parents. 174 By 1970, many
more states, but apparently still fewer than half, prohibited adopted
children from inheriting from their natural relatives. "[T]wenty-one
states now expressly prohibit an adopted child from inheriting the
estate of his intestate natural parents, ten other states statutorily
allow the inheritance and the remaining 19 states have no statute
dealing with the question." 175 In the states without these statutes,
"courts have almost uniformly permitted the adopted child to inherit
from his intestate natural parents."176 Although the uniform code 177
and many commentators recommended that states treat adoptees, for
inheritance purposes, like the natural children of their adoptive parents, eliminating their right to inherit from natural relatives,178 a majority of the states had not done so by 1970.179
In the general body of social services and other social science literature through the 1960s, the reasons given to support secrecy in
adoption proceedings were similar both to those officially proffered by
the Children's Bureau and the Child Welfare League of America 180
and to those expounded in the legal literature. Authors stressed the
importance of keeping the identities of birth parents and adoptive
parents unknown to one another.181 They also described the confidentiality concern associated with original birth records as a concern

172. Id. at 237. The author also noted that "[a]n increasing number of states accord
intestacy rights to the adoptive parents and relatives," and that there is a "pronounced
tendency to cut off the natural parents' right to succeed to the intestate estate of the
adoptee." [d. at 232.
173. See Pierce, supra note 169, at 37.
174. Seeid.at37-38.
175. Note, The Adopted Child's Inheritance from Intestate Natural Parents, 55 IOWA
L. REV. 739 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
176. [d. at 740.
177. See supra note 173.
178. See, e.g., Kuhlman, supra note 169, at 249; Pierce, supra note 169, at 40.
179. See supra notes 175-76.
180. Some authors were affiliated with or published by these influential organizations, or both. See supra notes 2, 107. The periodical Child Welfare is published by the
Child Welfare League of America.
181. See, e.g., Heisterman, supra note 40, at 289; Madison, Adoption: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow-Part II, 45 CHILD WELFARE 341, 344 (1966); Morlock, supra note
107, at 67-69.
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only that the adopted child be protected "from any stigmatizing identification on his birth certificate," and a few discussed the importance
of adult adoptees' rights to information about their birth families. 182
In this literature, there are many comments concerning the likelihood that adopted children will be curious about their birth families, and there is nearly universal agreement that adoptive parents
should tell children they are adopted. In contrast to an explosion of
articles beginning in the 1970s,183 there is little discussion of desire
on the part of adult adoptees to seek either information about or contact with birth relatives, and there is apparently no discussion of any
efforts by adoptees to do so. There is therefore no discussion of harms
or benefits that might accrue to adoptees or their birth parents from
such efforts. As in the legal literature, there also appears to be no
discussion of the desirability of legislation to close original birth records to adult adoptees. This may be in part because there had not
yet been a sizeable number of adult adoptees who had made such efforts, nor a sizeable number who had encountered and protested
closed birth records. l84 There was a huge increase in the popularity
and number of adoptions after World War 11,185 and many states did
not close birth records to adult adoptees until later than previously
thought.186 Furthermore, in a social context in which adoption was increasingly viewed as a perfect and complete substitute for creating a
family by childbirth,187 it may be that in the 1950s and 1960s, many
observers and commentators simply did not anticipate that any significant number of adult adoptees would wish to obtain identifying
information about their birth families.
With respect to telling children they are adopted, there were de182. ZIETZ, supra note 3, at 371; see also Huffman, Importance, supra note 45, at
351,357; Morlock, supra note 107, at 67.
183. See, e.g., HUFFMAN, Importance, supra note 45, at 356,358. She wrote in 1947
that "[tloo frequently in the past we have neglected the child's right to a document
linking his original and adoptive identities." Id. at 356. Further, she argued that this
information should be available "at the request of the adopted person when of age." Id.
at 358; see also E. Wellisch, Children Without Genealogy-A Problem of Adoption, 13
MENTAL HEALTH 41, 41 (1952); Helen Cominas, Minimizing the Risks of Adoption
Through Knowledge, 16 SOCIAL WORK 73, 79 (1971).
184. See supra notes 351-59.
185. Petitions to adopt rose from 16,000 in 1934 to 50,000 in 1944, and by the year
1962, to 121,000, of which fifty-two percent were filed by non-relatives. See Bernice Q.
Madison, Adoption-Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 1965 CONF. SOC. WORK 205,
206-07.
186. See supra Part II. A social worker and open records advocate noted in 1979,
"[tlhe fact that sealed records are a relatively recent phenomenon is confirmed by the
fact that adopted persons who are now in their thirties represent the first generation
to have had their birth records sealed at adoption." Joanne W. Small, Discrimination
Against the Adoptee, 37 PuB. WELFARE, Summer 1979, at 38,40.
187. See infra notes 223-56 and accompanying text.
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bates about how and at what age to tell, but most social service and
other social science literature recommended telling, and much of it
recommended telling at a very young age. ISS As a 1958 U.S. Children's Bureau pamphlet for prospective adoptive parents explained,
the child should be told, "[f]or someday, somehow, he'll learn. So you
be the one to tell him first. He loves and trusts you. If he first learns
from an outsider, it may seriously affect his feelings toward you. Let
him know from the beginning.»1S9 The pamphlet went on to advise:
"As he grows up he will want and need to know some of his own family history. Agencies will help with this if you wish."190 During this
period, professional literature "tended to accept as a given that the
adoptee would never know the true facts or identity of the birth parents."191 The notion of a search by an adoptee "was usually viewed as
fantasied or symbolic rather than literal."192 A book of advice for
adoptive parents, for example, simply reassured them not to become
"needlessly concerned" because sometimes an adopted adolescent
may ask where his birth parents are. All children sometimes feel that
they are misunderstood, the authors explained, and that "somewhere
in the world there must be the ideal parents.»193 Parents with biological children see this "as a very unreal, passing, momentary thought,"
while adoptive parents can mistake it for reality and think that their
child is yearning for his biological parents. 194 Perspective adoptive
parents are similarly told in another book that if they communicate
openly with their adopted children and empathize with the situations
of the children and their children's birth parents, then their children's fantasies about "real" parents, although they "are bound to be
stronger than those of the biological child, for they have grounding in
reality ... need not be much stronger.»195
188. See, e.g., BROOKS & BROOKS, supra note 42, at 183-87; CARP, supra note 5, at
124-37; FOSTER FAMILY CARE STANDARDS, supra note 137, at 35 (stating that adoptive
parents must "agree to tell the child that he is adopted"); RAEL JEAN ISAAC, ADOPTING
A CHILD TODAY 172 (1965); FLORENCE RONDELL & RUTH MICHAELS, THE ADOPTED
FAMILY, You AND YOUR CHILD: A GUIDE FOR ADOPTIVE PARENTS 24-27 (rev. ed. 1965);
JOHN TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS, THE EXPERIENCE OF ADOPTED PEOPLE 2-6
(1973); Madison, supra note 185, at 211-12.
189. U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, WHEN
You ADOPT A CHILD 23-24 (1958).
190. [d. at 25.
191. Marshall D. Schechter & Doris Bertocci, The Meaning of the Search, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 62, 65 (David M. Prodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter, eds.,
1990). The authors noted that "search ideation was generally presumed to be particularly salient during the developmental phase associated with consolidating identity,
that is, adolescence." [d. at 65-66.
192. [d. at 65.
193. RONDELL & MICHAELS, supra note 188, at 54-55.
194. [d.
195. ISAAC, supra note 188, at 188-92. Isaac relied on the work of Canadian sociolo-
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With respect to secrecy and the desires of unmarried mothers,
there are indications in the social service and other social science literature in this period that unmarried mothers sought a measure of
confidentiality. A careful examination of the literature, however, reveals the kind of protection they urgently sought and makes clear
that it was not protection from the discovery of their identity by their
surrendered children as adults. 196 As in the legal literature,197 there
are statements that agency-arranged, rather than independentlyarranged, adoptions better facilitate one kind of secrecy-keeping the
identities of adoptive parents and birth parents unknown to one another. For example, in arguing for the superiority of agency to independent adoptions, U.S. Children's Bureau consultant Maud Morlock
explained in a social work journal: When an unmarried mother gives
her rights to an agency, "this action protects the future security of
the adoptive home, for the identity of the adoptive parents can be
concealed from her."198 A book of advice for adoptive parents exhorts:
"Only an agency can act as a blank and impenetrable wall between
the identities of natural and adopting parents. Unfortunately, not
even a doctor or a lawyer can guarantee this anonymity to both
sides!"199
In the social service literature, however, there are also many
suggestions that agencies, as part of their efforts to promote agency-

gist and adoptive father, H. David Kirk, whose 1964 book Shared Fate criticized what
he characterized as the prevailing "rejection-of-difference" orientation of adoptive parents and argued that adoptive families are more successful when they acknowledge
and are open to communication about their differences from biological families. See H.
DAVID KIRK, SHARED FATE 98-99 (1964). Even Kirk, however, did not discuss in that
book whether adoptees might wish to seek identifying information about or contact
with their birth families, although he did quote a clinical case study that contrasted
adoptive parents who made their child feel as if the subject of adoption could not be
discussed-parents to whom the child did not feel close-with adoptive parents who
gave their adopted child information about her origins and who "had a free-flowing"
kind of relationship with her. Id. at 97-98. The latter parents' child "was not in conflict
and was not interested to know if there was more to be learned about her original parents." Id. at 97 (quoting a clinical report).
196. In historian Carp's study of the treatment of adoption agency records, he did
not distinguish between birth mothers' desires to conceal their situations from their
families and communities, and birth mothers' attitudes with respect to their children
obtaining identifying information when the children become adults. He asserted that
"it was unwed mothers themselves who had originally demanded secrecy," meaning
secrecy that included lifelong anonymity, but he did not describe any documentary evidence in support of his assertion. CARP, supra note 5, at 112.
197. For examples of such statements in the legal literature, see L.A. Bar Ass'n, supra note 161, at 327; TenBroek, supra note 150, at 320; William H. Borchers, Note,
Texas Adoption Statute, 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 117, 119 (1951); Note, Improving the Adoption Process: The Pennsylvania Adoption Act, 102 U. PENN. L. REV. 759, 771-72 (1954).
198. Morlock, supra note 107, at 69; see also CARP, supra note 5, at 113.
199. CARL Doss & HELEN Doss, IF You ADOPT A CHILD 72 (1957).
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arranged adoption, should provide birth mothers with the greater
measure of confidentiality that they often enjoyed in independent
adoptions.20o This apparent contradiction can be resolved by understanding the kind of confidentiality birth mothers were seeking. They
sought arrangements that would conceal their pregnancies from their
parents or from other members of their communities, or from both,
rather than arrangements that would necessarily conceal their identity from adoptive parents, or by extension, from their surrendered
children when those children reached adulthood. Their predicament,
explained in a 1959 account, was that when an unmarried mother
left her home community to seek assistance from an agency elsewhere, she might encounter public and private agencies that would
not serve nonresidents, or often she might be told that it was necessary to inform her home community's public welfare department.
These practices discouraged unmarried mothers from using agency
services, and therefore encouraged black market activities through
which, to the detriment of children, "many couples who are rejected
by recognized adoption agencies. . . find children available to them
through illegal channels."201 A book on adoption for perspective adoptive parents similarly explained that among the reasons an unmarried mother may not turn to social agencies is the fact that if she is
financially needy, most agencies refer her to the welfare department
where she learns she may have to start a paternity suit and "get up
in a public court to relate her story in all its embarrassing detail."202
An unmarried mother may also be "warned that an investigator
might go to her parents to learn if they could contribute to her support, even though she insisted that at all costs the fact of her pregnancy must be kept from her family.'>203
IV. SOCIAL CONTEXTS AND ADOPTEES' ACCESS TO BIRTH RECORDS

It is difficult, in sum, to find through the 1960s expressions of
specific reasons for closing original birth records to adult adoptees,
either in the publications of public and private agencies or in the
writings of legal and of social service and other social science authorities, although one frequently finds advanced in such sources
200. See infra notes 201-03.
201. ZIETZ, supra note 3, at 368.
202. ISAAC, supra note 188, at 66.
203. [d. Similarly, the report on a 1955 conference sponsored by the U.S. Children's
Bureau emphasized that "[c]onfidentiality is the key to service to the unmarried
mother. The lack of confidentiality, more than any other single factor, drives girls to
independent plans." PROTECTING CHILDREN IN ADOPTION, supra note 108, at 33. The
report explained that public agencies may be required to notify other people of the
pregnancy, and that unmarried mothers thought both that they may have to give information about their residences and families, and that agency records may be open to
public inspection. See id. at 11, 30-31; see also CARP, supra note 5, at 111-15.
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specific reasons for closing court records to all persons and for closing
original birth records to all persons except adult adoptees. Why then
did almost all states close these birth records, albeit more slowly and
later than has generally been believed? Some reasons can be identified by analyzing the complex ways in which law both reflects and, in
turn, affects social attitudes and understandings, that is, the ways in
which law reflects and affects the social context in which it exists.
A helpful theoretical apparatus for such an analysis is provided
in aspects of the "law and society" framework explicated by Lawrence
Lessig in his article The Regulation of Social Meaning. 204 Professor
Lessig describes individuals' acts-acts such as an adoptee's expressing interest in obtaining identifying information about or contact
with birth relatives-as having social meanings, either a single
meaning or a "range or distribution of meanings." 205 The social meanings of acts are, of course, a function of their social context, of "the
collection of understandings or expectations shared by some group at
a particular time and place.''206 The more the group's understandings
or expectations "appear natural, or necessary, or uncontested, or invisible, the more powerful or unavoidable or natural social meanings
drawn from them appear to be."207 The social meanings of acts are
both constructed by and construct the social context, and governmental actions as well as the collective action of individuals can play a
role in the construction of social meanings. 20B
For example, as applied to this history of adoption, the early actions of state governments making access to adoption records unlawful in some circumstances may be understood as an unintentional instance of one of the techniques Professor Lessig describes for affecting social meanings. 209 The states' acts of "tying" the stigma of illegality to the availability of identifying information under some circumstances may have contributed to changing the social meaning of seeking identifying information under other circumstances, thus making
searches by adult adoptees appear to be unnatural and wrong, to be
failures of the adoption process. 210 In turn, such changes in social
meaning likely affected social attitudes and understandings, helping
to foster an understanding that lifelong secrecy was an essential feature of adoption. Similarly, but to opposite effect, the more recent actions of individuals and groups seeking greater openness in adoption
204. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995).
205. [d. at 955.
206. [d. at 958.
207. [d. at 960-6l.
208. See id. at 962-86.
209. See id. at 1009-10.
210. See infra Part N.A.

402

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:367

may be understood as efforts to use "tying" for the more difficult task
of overcoming "the existing structures of social stigma."211 Adoptees'
expression of interest in their origins may be de-stigmatized, that is,
made to seem more sympathetic and natural, more right than wrong,
both by providing mutual support to searching adoptees and birth
relatives and by connecting their interest in their origins with compelling stories about urgent searches that have resulted in successful
outcomes. "Re-changing" the social meanings of actions in this way,
and in turn the social attitudes and understandings of which they are
a function, may then advance the goal of legislative change. Finally,
the actions of those state governments that foreclosed adult adoptee
access to birth records in the thirty years after 1960 may be understood as a part of what Professor Lessig calls a "defensive construction" of social meanings, that is, an attempt to "preserv[e] an old
meaning"212 when it is threatened. 213
The use of this social context and meanings framework is intended to shed some new light on the history of adult adoptee access
to birth records. It is not intended to suggest that other analytical
approaches may not be equally illuminating, such as an analysis of
the roles played by and the power relationships among interest
groupS.214 Adoption attorneys and adoption agency officials had financial and institutional incentives to satisfy prospective adoptive parents' desires to have children who are as much "their own" as possible and, therefore, connected to other families as little as possible.
The agencies and attorneys may also have had financial and institutional incentives to conduct adoption arrangements with a minimal
possibility of future scrutiny. In any analysis of the roles played by
actors such as attorneys and agency officials in the passage and
maintenance of laws, however, social attitudes and understandings
would remain a significant factor.
A.

Through the 19608

You have no right to any information whatsoever. You were
adopted legally .... You had no other parents. 216
-Adoptee Florence Fisher, quoting a remark made in 1951 by
the lawyer who had arranged her adoption.

211. Lessig, supra note 204, at 999.
212. Id. at 987.
213. See infra Part IV.B.
214. For an example of such an approach in an analysis of laws regulating transracial adoptions, see Ruth Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Laws and Practices in 2000:
Serving Whose Interests?, 33 FAM. L.Q. 677 (1999).
215. FLORENCE FISHER, THE SEARCH FOR ANNA FISHER 84 (1973) (recounting an
interview in New York City).
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Your need to look for your mother is neurotic. You are rationalizing
why you must know who your 'real' parents, as"'you call them,
are. 216
-Adoptee Betty Jean Lifton, quoting a remark made in the mid1950s by a psychiatrist she had consulted during her search.

The paucity of explicit reasons articulated through the 1960s for
eliminating adult adoptee access to birth records suggests that when
many court records were sealed and some original birth records were
sealed even from adult adoptees, the closings of the birth records to
adult adoptees reflected emerging attitudes and understandings, a
social context, and not a legislative response to real or imagined
problems associated with such access. Adoption was coming to be
seen as a perfect or complete substitute for the creation of families
through childbirth,217 and the sealing of records in some states even
to adult adoptees may have been undertaken as a step consonant
with this understanding. Over time, as most states passed laws sealing records from the parties, except adult adoptees, this new legal regime of partial secrecy may itself have affected the evolution of the
social context.
The specific rationale for closing records to the parties was to
prevent the possibility of birth parents interfering with adoptive
families. 218 But as most states proceeded to tie the stigma of illegality
to the availability of adoption records to birth parents, adoptive parents, and minor adoptees, the states may also have affected social attitudes and understandings associated with adult adoptee access to
records. The act by an adoptee of expressing interest in his or her
birth family began to acquire negative social meanings. As discussed
below, adoptees interested in learning about their families of origin
began to experience strong social constraints: those who sought such
information were met in many quarters with disapprobation and
were even regarded as psychologically disturbed.219 Ultimately, an
expectation of lifelong secrecy among the parties seems to have become firmly established, an expectation that both reflected and fostered the negative social meanings associated with adoptees seeking
information. 220 Lifelong secrecy apparently came to "appear natural,
or necessary, or uncontested,"221 so natural, necessary, or uncontested
that eventually the distinction between sealing court records from all
216.

BE'ITY JEAN LIFTON, TWICE BORN: MEMOIRS OF AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER 108

(1977) (recounting a consultation with a psychiatrist in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
when she was searching for her birth mother).
217. See infra notes 223-56 and accompanying text.
218. See supra Part III.
219. See infra notes 258-69 and accompanying text.
220. See infra notes 271-84 and accompanying text; Part N.B.
221. Lessig, supra note 204, at 960-61.
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inspection and sealing birth records from inspection even by adult
adoptees became lost. Recent history forgotten, "closed records" came
to be written and thought about in a unitary sense. 222
The social understanding that was probably reflected in the earliest closings of birth records to adult adoptees was that adoption was
a perfect and complete substitute for the creation of families through
childbirth. The new birth certificate issued after adoption substituted
the adoptive parents' names for the birth parents' names, "showing ... the adoptive parents as the real parents," as one law review
article explained. 223 The law could confer on children in need offamilies new identities that would obliterate forever their original identities, and the law could provide adoptive parents with children who,
like children born to them, would have no connection to any other
family. This idea of adoption was facilitated by a partial swing of the
pendulum away from nature and closer to nurture as the basis of
human development. 224 The idea also was in keeping in the immediate post-World War II years with both a pro-family, pro-natal ideology,225 and a complementary notion that young, white unmarried
mothers, by giving up their babies for adoption, could overcome the
psychological problems that had led to their predicaments and make
fresh starts in their lives. 226
The understanding of adoption as a perfect and complete substitute for creating a family through birth was discernable in the practices of many adoption agencies, practices that embodied "the myth
that once the adoption was legalized ... the child would be the same
'as if born' to the adopting parents."227 In the mid-1950s, many agencies tried "to match physical characteristics of adoptee and adopters
as well as the presumed intellectual capacity, educational background, and socioeconomic status of the potential adoptive couple
and the birth parents. Religion matching was also common as were
age restrictions for the applicant couple.»228 In the eyes of a contemporary critic, sociologist, and adoptive parent H. David Kirk, these
222. See infra notes 271-84, 359-74.
223. Haertle, supra note 151, at 43.
224. See infra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
225. See infra notes 237-44 and accompanying text.
226. See infra notes 245-56 and accompanying text.
227. Janette Thompson, Roots and Rights-A Challenge for Adoption, Soc. WORKER
13, 13 (1979) (reporting a study by the Children's Aid Society of Metro Toronto, Canada). The author notes that adoptive parents were encouraged to tell children of their
adoption, but then were offered little help. Adopting parents received "euphemistically" presented birth history "to ensure the complete acceptance of the child's past by
the adopters in the hope that this would permit a lasting bond to develop. A worthwhile hope-but one which ignored the fact that the history actually belonged to the
child." [d.
228. Sokoloff, supra note 31, at 23.
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and other practices, although not necessarily undesirable in themselves, reinforced what he considered to be an unhealthy but predominant "rejection-of-difference" orientation of adoptive parents.
Additional agency practices he identified as encouraging this type of
orientation were: not providing services after legalization of the
adoption, revealing limited information about children's background,
placing children at a geographical distance from their birth parents,
and keeping records confidential. Influenced by this rejection-ofdifference orientation, adoptive parents, even when telling children
of their adoption, were hesitant to acknowledge that there might be
any significant differences between adoptive and biological families. 229 To another, later observer, the agency practice in the 1950s of
placing infants at a younger age than formerly, while it "grew up in
response to theory about what was best for the children, ... reinforced the adoptive parents' denial that adoptive parenting was significantly different from biological parenting."23o
Among legal commentators, the view was expressed that adopted
children should be on an identical legal footing with biological children. Thus, a number of writers criticized the inheritance laws of the
time that limited adoptive children's rights to inherit through their
adoptive relatives and permitted adopted children to continue inheriting from birth relatives. "In legal and social contemplation the child
is taken from his natural family and made a member of a new family
with full standing as though one of its blood." The laws of inheritance
therefore should be "in furtherance of the currently prevailing social
attitude that adoption effects a complete substitution of families.'>231
229. See KIRK, supra note 195, at 152-53. His research suggested that acknowledgment of differences in coping activities "are conducive to good communication and thus
to order and dynamic stability in adoptive families," whereas rejection of differences
"can be expected to make for poor communication with subsequent disruptive results
for the adoptive relationship." Id. at 93. Kirk's book, as well as an empirical study in
the early 1960s that noted that a greater proportion of adopted children sought mental
health services, are credited with first stimulating widespread interest in the psychology of adoption. See David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter, Preface to THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION, supra note 191, at ix, x. Although Kirk's theory has been
criticized,
its importance cannot be denied. For one thing, it represented the first major
theoretical effort to conceptualize adoptive family life, in contrast to earlier
psychoanalytic writings on adoption which generally focused on the individual dynamics of children and parents. It also helped to normalize many of
the adjustment difficulties among adoptees and adoptive parents. Finally,
the theory was of critical importance in opening up the adoption process.
Id. at x-xi.
230. Kenneth W. Watson, Who Is the Primary Client?, PUB. WELFARE, Summer
1979, at 11-12.
231. Uhlenhopp, supra note 158, at 285 (asserting in inheritance context that relationship with natural parents be severed to promote "the completeness of the adoptive
relationship"); Kuhlmann, supra note 171, at 248-49; see also, Recent Case, Adoption-
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The understanding of adoption as a perfect and complete substitute for creating a family through childbirth was supported by the
partial swing of the pendulum in the first half of the century away
from nature and toward nurture. A 1939 book that is part advice to
prospective adopters and part academic study noted a former tendency "to stress heredity and to discount environment"232 and advised
instead: "What is done with a child after he is born counts more than
the circumstances of his birth. He holds possibilities within himself
which parental influence and general environment can either develop
or crush. To Nature must be added Nurture."233 Identifying this swing
toward nurture is not to suggest, of course, that potential adoptees
were not carefully screened by agencies for mental or physical defects
and "the grosser hereditary or congenital taints."z34 But apparently,
this kind of pro-nurture advice was influential. "Adoptions are popular," the U.S. Children's Bureau proclaimed in 1955. "This widespread interest reflects a drastic change in attitude during the past
two or three decades."235 A professor of social welfare explained in
1959 that the demand for children to adopt had greatly increased
when the behavioral sciences could reliably assure adoptive parents
that "parental morality or immorality was not genetically transmitted, that the adopted child would reflect their behavior and attitudes
rather than those of his natural parents, and that the child's illegitimate birth status was not tantamount to his becoming a criminal, a
sexual psychopath, or some other type of deviant."236
The understanding of adoption as a perfect and complete substi-

Descent and Distribution-Right to Inherit in a Dual Capacity When Adoptive Parent
Is Blood Relative, 30 MINN. L. REV. 395, 396 (1946) (arguing that inheritance through
natural parents should not be pennitted in order to further the notion that the adoptee
be given complete legal status as a child of the adopting parents); Kiefer, supra note
163, at 402-03 (alleging that failure to allow adoptive parents and relatives to inherit
from adopted child stems from a failure to understand the necessity of "effecting a
complete substitution of the adoptive for the natural parents").
232. BROOKS & BROOKS, supra note 42, at 12.
233. Id. at 16.
234. Id. at 21; see also Sokoloff, supra note 31, at 23.
235. PROTECTING CHILDREN, supra note 108, at 5. For a discussion of the protraditional family, pro-natal ideology in the post-World War II period that was another
factor contributing to the increasing popularity of adoption, see infra notes 237-44 and
accompanying text.
236. ZIETZ, supra note 3, at 366. Reassurance was also provided to adopters by the
psychological explanations that developed in the 1940s and 1950s for white unmarried
mothers' pregnancies: "The biological stain of illegitimacy had been pennanent, but
the neuroses of illegitimacy could be removed with help from a caseworker. The white
out-of-wedlock child, therefore, was no longer a flawed by-product of innate immorality
and low intelligence." RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY
AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE 152 (1992); see infra notes 245-56 and accompanying
text.
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tute for creating a family through childbirth was also encouraged in
the immediate post-World War II generation, in the aftermath of
wartime social and economic dislocations, by a pervasive protraditional family and pro-natal ideology. In the light of this "post
war family imperative,"237 adoption conferred the dual social benefit
of creating the desired family group and offering a solution to the
problem of unmarried mothers and their children. 238 This protraditional family, pro-natal ideology is very much evident in the
documentary history of adoption. The 1959 book by a social welfare
professor explained that because one of the major purposes of marriage in Western culture is bearing and raising children, childless
couples seek to adopt to fulfill their "unmet maternal and paternal
needs," and "[t]he process of adoption then tends to complete the cultural image of the most sanctified and revered of our social institutions-marriage and the family."239 Or, as the Child Welfare League's
1958 Standards for Adoption Service put it, "[a]doption as a means of
creating families has had growing acceptance in our society. Great
value is placed on children, and a family without children is considered incomplete."24o The League noted that while the demand for
white infants greatly exceeded the number available, "many unmarried mothers, as well as some married parents who find it necessary,
are more ready than formerly to relinquish children for adoption."z41
In a 1956 article on adoption practices in which the League's executive director Joseph H. Reid acknowledged that "[b]road cultural
considerations have affected deeply the principles and convictions of
[social service] agencies,"242 Reid offered an extreme example of this
social mood, in terms that may sound cruelly conformist to our turnof-the-century ears: "A family in the United States is not considered
complete or meaningful unless it has children. Childless couples have
a multiplicity and diversity of pressures upon them to have children .... It can be fairly said that it is not socially acceptable not to
have them."243 As for the woman who gives birth outside of marriage,
he continued:
An agency has a responsibility of pointing out to the unmarried
mother the extreme difficulty, if not the impossibility, if she re-

237. SOLINGER, supra note 236, at 154.
238. When one speaks of a pervasive ideology or social consensus, it is not to suggest, of course, that there were not contrary views or dissension in the society. See,
e.g., supra note 229 and accompanying text; infra note 244.
239. ZIETZ, supra note 3, at 368-69.
240. 1958 STANDARDS, supra note 135, at 1.
241. [d.
242. Joseph H. Reid, Principles, Values, and Assumptions Underlying Adoption
Practice, 1956 NAT'L CON. SOC. WORK 136.
243. [d.
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mains unmarried, of raising her child successfully in our culture
without damage to the child and to herself.... The concept that
the unmarried mother and her child constitute a family is to me
unsupportable. There is no family in any real sense of the word. 244

The white unmarried mother was thus to some, with her "uncontained female sexuality, ... a major threat to the middle-class family."245 A new psychological view of the unmarried mother supported
the idea that her child, when surrendered for adoption, should be
completely and forever severed from the child's birth family. Although not without some vigorous critics,246 this view of the unmarried white mother was that she was mentally ill, had become pregnant on purpose, and was in need of treatment to recover and later
attain normal family life within marriage. Black unmarried mothers,
in contrast, tended to be viewed either as part of a cultural context in
which out-of-wedlock birth was "an accepted way of life rooted in the
cultural and economic legacies of slavery,"247 or as being biologically
subject to "uncontrolled, sexual indulgence."248 Unmarried black
mothers were generally expected to keep their babies, as most black
and white unmarried mothers had done in an earlier era. 249
Popular psychoanalytic theories influenced developing ideas
about white women's out-of-wedlock pregnancies in the 1940s and
1950s: 250 "[T]he unplanned pregnancy was understood to be a form of
sexual acting out of unconscious needs and as such was seen as an
expression of unresolved parent-child conflicts. Furthermore, it was
assumed that the pregnancy represented significant psychopathology
in the mother."251 Exhaustively canvassing professional literature,
244. Id. at 139. Of course, these views were not wholly embraced by all. In a U.S.
Children's Bureau report of a meeting of a group of social workers held in the same
year, the point was emphasized that the argument for early placement of infants
"rested on the presumption that the mother has had an opportunity to receive help in
weighing alternatives, understanding her feelings, and reaching a good decision." URSULA M. GALLAGHER, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SOCIAL WORKERS
LOOK AT ADOPTION 9 (1958). Discomfort over pressure for adoption was described by
historian Solinger: "Some service providers felt the mandate was too coercively and too
universally applied to white unmarried mothers." SOLINGER, supra note 236, at 155.
There were objections to concentrating resources on adoption and not developing services for unmarried mothers, and fears about unwed mothers without sufficient services being "vulnerable to black marketeers interested only in making money off of
them." Id.
245. SOLINGER, supra note 236, at 101.
246. See, e.g., ISAAC, supra note 188, at 46-51.
247. Anne B. Brodzinsky, Surrendering an Infant for Adoption: The Birthmother
Experience, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION, supra note 191, at 295, 298.
248. SOLINGER, supra note 236, at 24.
249. See id. at 151-52.
250. Brodzinsky, supra note 247, at 297.
251. Id.; see also CARP, supra note 5, at 114-16.
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historian Rickie Solinger chronicled this development in her book on
unmarried pregnancy and race. She detailed how this understanding
was found attractive and useful by service providers. 252 The unmarried mother's baby could be seen as an object of the psychological
problem,253 and the mentally unhealthy mother as ill-equipped to be a
satisfactory mother for the baby.254 The unmarried mother, however,
could be cured, and she should be rehabilitated, or redeemed, so that
she might become marriageable once again. "Essentially, the cure for
the white unmarried mother required three steps: remorse; relinquishment of the infant for adoption; and renewed commitment to
fulfilling her destiny as a real woman."255 As a report of a U.S. Children's Bureau conference rather starkly put it:
Besides a humanitarian interest in helping girls in trouble, another
important reason exists for being concerned about their future.
Most of them are in the early years of their child-bearing period.
Most of them will have other children, hopefully in wedlock. The
community has a real stake in helping these girls become stable
wives and mothers. 256

It is likely that it was both the understanding of adoption as a
perfect and complete substitution for creating a family by childbirth,
and the regime of secrecy created by nearly universal laws closing
adoption records to birth parents, adoptive parents, and minor
adoptees, that led to the association of negative social meanings with
the acts of adult adoptees who sought information about birth families. These negative meanings are evidenced both by professionals'
view of adoptees who sought information about their birth families
and by the social constraints those adoptees reported feeling when
they undertook searches. From professional quarters, one source of
disapprobation was the psychoanalytically influenced view that
searching adoptees were the psychologically disturbed products of
unsuccessful adoptions. The influential psychiatrist Viola Bernard
wrote in 1953 that a normal adolescent's "need for connection with
his past" can be satisfied by his adoptive parents giving him nonidentifying information or, if necessary, bringing him back to an
252. See SOLINGER, supra note 236, at 86·186 passim.
253. See id. at 96 ("[Tlhe baby ... was posited as simply an object of its mother's
psychological disturbance.").
254. See id. at 98 (stating how an unwed mother was seen as not being in a position
to be an adequate parent to the child); see also CARP, supra note 5, at 115-16.
255. SOLINGER, supra note 236, at 94. There were those who expressed more sympathy for the feelings ofthe surrendering unmarried mother. For example, the report of a
1957 federal government-sponsored meeting of a small group of social workers admonished social workers to "be aware of the pain and psychological implications inherent
in separation and offer help and support through this troubled period." GALLAGHER,
supra note 244, at 8.
256. PROTECTING CHILDREN, supra note 108, at 15.
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agency that can provide more non-identifying details. However,
"[o]ccasionally we see tragically pathological distortions ... very disturbed young people who .. , develop an all-consuming, obsessing
need to locate their biologic[al] parents who in fantasy, or even delusion, have become the idealized good parents in contrast to the adoptive 'bad' parents with whom they are usually no longer in contact."257
The "antidote" to such pathology is a good relationship between the
adoptee and his adoptive parents. "In emotionally healthy adoption ... the child's involvement with his biological parents remains
within bounds."258 Although Bernard's view purported to be based on
psychiatrist Florence Clothier's earlier work, it seems to go far beyond it. Dr. Clothier had simply speculated that the "family romance"
of analytic literature may be more complex and difficult for the
adopted child. The biological child can indulge in the fantasy that his
parents are not his real parents "as in a game," secure in the love of
his real parents, whereas the adopted child actually does have two
sets of parents "and the correction of the foundling fantasy by reality
is much less likely than in the own child."259 Social workers apparently embraced the negative psychoanalytic view, however, as historian Carp documented through his research into the files of one
agency. The agency's 1968 adoption manual characterized a searching adult adoptee as "a person who 'has had many unhappy past experiences and ... is so intent upon finding the natural parent that he
is not able to consider his request in a realistic or rational way."'260
Consequently, the manual advised caseworkers to discourage the
search and then, if necessary, to refer the person for psychological
treatment. 261
Adoptees felt discouraged from seeking information ''by the prevailing mood of society at large, by social workers, and by adoptive
parents that such interest was unnatural or showed ingratitude."262
Adoptees' experience of this disapproving social attitude inspired the
defensively defiant name of a large adoptees' rights organization:
Bastard Nation. It is a central theme in the autobiographical accounts by adoptees that are widely credited with spurring the move-

257. Viola W. Bernard, Application of Psychoanalytic Concepts to Adoption Agency
Practice, in READINGS IN ADOPTION 395,430-31 (1. Evelyn Smith ed., 1963). For information about Bernard's influential role, see CARP, supra note 5, at 130-34.
258. [d. at 431.
259. Florence Clothier, The Psychology of the Adopted Child, 27 MENTAL HEALTH
231, 229-30 (1943); see Florence Clothier, Some Aspects of the Problem of Adoption, 9
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 598,612-14 (1939).
260. CARP, supra note 5, at 120.
261. [d.
262. Joseph D. Harrington, The Courts Contend with Sealed Adoption Records, PuB.
WELFARE, Spring 1980, at 29, 31.
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ment for greater openness in adoption.263 In her 1973 book The
Search for Anna Fisher, a dramatic account of her more than twentyyear search for her birth parents, Florence Fisher related her frustration with the often unsympathetic and hostile receptions she received through the years from the doctor and lawyer who arranged
her adoption, hospital administrators, court personnel, and others.
The doctor asked her: "Aren't you grateful? [Your parents] took you
in when no one else wanted yoU."264 When she pleaded with a court
clerk to see the file he was holding in his hand, he told her, "These
records were sealed, and they'll stay sealed. You haven't got a chance
in a million of ever getting to see these papers. You've got to get special permission from the judge, lady, and he'll never give it to yoU."265
Fisher's Adoptees' Liberty Movement Association (ALMA), according
to one adoptee and social worker member, liberated her from "the
conviction ... 'it was sick to be curioUS."'266 Another adoptee and social worker, who had found her birth family, catalogued negative
views toward searching adoptees. She quoted an adoptive parent opposed to open records because "'[gJiving a hunting license usually
portends ill for the quarry,'" another who "declared that [searching
adoptees] appear to lack impulse control, not unlike thieves," and a
lawyer who testified that an adoptee might use information "to find
and murder his biological parent."267
This disapproving social attitude is apparent in later judicial
opinions as well. In one Missouri case, the court reported that an
adoptee conceded she had not sought information from her adoptive
parents "'because they would be hurt,'" but "risking that hurt and the
possibility of disturbing their relationship, she commenced a
search."268 In a companion case, a forty-eight-year-old adoptee argued
that "'assurance for anonymity should not be preserved at the expense of the adoptee, for it is unjust that a child should suffer for the
263. See, e.g., KITTSON, supra note 1; FISHER, supra note 215; LIFTON, supra note
216. Paton and Lifton also wrote about the experiences of other adoptees. See JEAN M.
PATON, THE ADOPTED BREAK SILENCE (1954); BETTY JEAN LIFTON, LOST AND FOUND:
THE ADOPTION EXPERIENCE (1979). Paton and Fisher formed support and advocacy
organizations. See PAUL SACHDEV, UNLOCKING THE ADOPTION FILES 1-2 (1989) (describing the roles of Paton and Fisher); WEGAR, supra note 34, at 74-75 (describing the
role of autobiographical accounts in mobilization of the search movement).
264. FISHER, supra note 215, at 63.
265. Id. at 87.
266. Annette Baran et aI., Adoptive Parents and the Sealed Record Controversy,
SOC. CASEWORK 531, 532 (1974) (quoting Babette Dalsheimer, Adoption Runs in My
Family, Ms., Aug. 1973, at 82, 86).
267. Small, supra note 186, at 41; see also, e.g., ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE
ADOPTION TRIANGLE: THE EFFECTS OF THE SEALED RECORD ON ADOPTEES, BIRTH PARENTS, AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS 146-49 (1978) (giving first-person accounts of search
experiences in which adoptees experienced strong disapproval).
268. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
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transgressions of his parents.",269 The court discerned in his argument
"a casual indifference toward rights of the natural parents and ... a
knowledge of improper conduct on their part, of which neither petitioner nor this court have information and quite properly should
not."270
The negative social meanings associated with adult adoptees' interest in information about birth families in turn were likely both reflected in and further fostered by the emerging understanding that
lifelong secrecy was an essential feature of adoption. That this understanding became firmly established over time is confirmed by the
way in which recent history has faded from collective memory.271 For
example, the distinction between sealing court records to all persons
and sealing birth records even to those whose births they register
was lost. This loss of the distinction is evidenced by later statements
in legal literature as well as later incidents in which state officials
expressed confusion about or resisted statutory commands to provide
adult adoptees with birth records. A law review article published in
1975, for example, criticized a "lack of consistency" in statutes that
"results from the fact that the sealed records statutes are generally
found in both the adoption statutes and in the separate public health
and records statutes."272 The author apparently included in this "inconsistency" those statutory schemes that sealed court records completely, while permitting adult adoptee access to original birth records. 273 Similarly, the author of a comment in 1978 recommended
that "[s]uch inconsistency between confidentiality statutes under a
state's domestic relations laws and statutes of disclosure under its
vital statistics laws should be examined and corrected by state legislatures."274
In Pennsylvania, the Department of Health sought the attorney
general's opinion about the vital statistics law that provided access to
original birth records "upon request of the person involved if he has
attained majority and is not incompetent, or upon request of his parent, guardian or legal representative.'>275 In 1978, the Pennsylvania
attorney general responded that this law was not negated by a provision of the Commonwealth's adoption law concerning court records,
under which "[am petitions, exhibits, reports, notes of testimony, de269. In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Mo. 1978) (en bane).
270. Id.
271. See infra Part N.B.
272. Michael L. Hanley, A Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee's Sealed Records Dilemma, 2 OHIO N.V. L. REv. 542, 545 (1975) (footnote omitted).
273. See id.
274. James R. Carter, Comment, Confidentiality of Adoption Records: An Examination, 52 TUL. L. REV. 817, 821 (1978) (footnote omitted).
275. 14 Op. Pa. Att'y Gen. 43 (1978).

2001]

THE IDEA OF ADOPTION

413

crees, and other papers ... shall be ... withheld from inspection except on an order of court granted upon good cause shown.,,276 The two
laws "are not irreconcilable as a matter of law; nor have they been as
a matter of practice."277 When the Pennsylvania legislature acted six
years later to eliminate adult adoptee access to birth records, it did
not amend the vital statistics provision, but instead passed a law declaring that the vital statistics provision was "repealed insofar as [it
is] inconsistent with" the law "relating to impounding of [court] proceedings and access to records."278 Similarly in Oklahoma, an attorney general's opinion was sought to answer the question whether the
law did, as it appeared to, "confer upon an adopted person of legal
age an absolute right, upon demand of the State Registrar, to see his
original birth certificate."279 In New Hampshire, the attorney general's opinion was sought in the mid-1960s. State law sealed adoption
court records but not original birth records. State practice was that
inspection of such birth records was at the discretion of the state registrar or the town clerk. The attorney general, relying on the statutory provision sealing court records, advised that the registrar had
the "authority and the duty" to direct town clerks not to cross reference original and amended certificates, making it impossible to furnish original records to adoptees who did not already know their
original surnames. 280
In Florida and Louisiana, adoptees went to court in the mid1970s to force records custodians to comply with laws requiring, respectively, that the adoptee be "furnish[ed] the original birth certificate ... 'at the instance and request of the person whose birth is the
subject of the said certificate"'281 and that the adoptee have access
upon demand, by order of a court.282 Although the Florida court enforced the state statute, it noted "there may be compelling reasons
supporting the [state custodian's] position."283 In Louisiana a year
later, and in Florida four years later, legislatures eliminated adult
adoptees' court confirmed right of access to the records.284

276. [d.
277. [d.
278. 1984 Pa. Laws 195 (amending the Vital Statistics Laws of 1953).
279. 14 Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 204 (1982); see supra notes 98-99 and accompanying
text.
280. lOp. N.H. Att'y Gen. 186 (1966).
281. State Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., Health Program Office v. Mullarkey,
340 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
282. Chambers, 349 So. 2d at 426.
283. Mullarkey, 340 So. 2d at 124.
284. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 296; 1997 La. Acts 659.
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From the 19608

Ample evidence in the literature suggests that an adoptee's desire
to know his biological roots is not idle curiosity of individuals who
are psychologically and socially impaired ... but is nearly a universal phenomenon in normal personality development. 285
-Social work professor Paul Sachdev, 1989.
Our Reunion Registry Databank is a multi-level, computerized,
cross-linking system, containing the vital statistics of adoptees,
natural parents and all persons separated by adoption for possible
matching. . . . For example, if a mother who gave up a son born
May 20, 1930 in St. Luke's Hospital, New York and an adopted
male with matching information both register with us, we put them
in touch without delay .
. . . ALMA [Adoptee's Liberty Movement Association] has reunited more than 100,000 families separated by adoption, and we
take pride in our accomplishments. 286
-ALMA website, 2000.

The understanding that lifelong secrecy was an essential feature
of adoption continued to gain currency even as a social revolution
was occurring, a revolution that challenged both lifelong secrecy and
the understanding of adoption as a perfect and complete substitute
for creating a family by childbirth. Although some adoption agency
practices287 were affected and some legislative changes were made,288
of the twenty states that in 1960 had laws allowing adu~t adoptees
access to original birth records, all but three nevertheless went on to
join those states that had earlier eliminated the right.289 Only three
states have since re-established an unqualified right of access to
birth records: 290 Tennessee in 1995, Oregon in 1998, and Alabama in
285. SACHDEV, supra note 263, at 14-15.
286. Adoptee's Liberty Movement Association, at http://www.almanet.com ("Registry Databank" and "Membership Information" pages). The organization's registry is
one of many available on the World Wide Web. The largest registry is the International Soundex Reunion Registry, which is available free of charge to searching
adoptees and birth relatives. ISRR, http://www.isrr.com. For lists of registries and
other search resources, and links to lists of registries and other search resources, see
http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org (American Adoption Congress website);
http://www.bastards.org/library.search.htm (a page on the Bastard Nation website).
287. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Cole & Kathryn D. Donley, History, Values, and Placement Policy Issues in Adoption, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION, supra note 192, at
273,280-94 (discussing issues that arise during each stage of the adoption process).
288. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of states'
passive and active mutual consent registries).
289. See supra notes 70-102 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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2000. Two have established a qualified right291 and seven others a
qualified right of access only for adoptees in future adoptions. 292 The
persistence of lifelong secrecy and the related negative view of adult
adoptee interest in birth families demonstrate the difficulty Professor
Lessig describes of changing social meanings because of a conscious
or unconscious tendency of "defensive construction," that is, a tendency to preserve established but threatened meanings. 293
The understanding that lifelong secrecy was an essential feature
of adoption, and the negative social meanings that were a function of
that understanding, were defensively constructed by the actions of
the states that in more recent years eliminated adult adoptees' right
of access to birth records. The states reinforced both the threatened
understanding and meanings by making the act of seeking information unlawful. The understanding and meanings were defensively
constructed in a more unconscious way by the emergence of a common, ahistorical idea about the development of secrecy in adoptionthe idea that from the earliest enactments establishing secrecy
among the parties, a central purpose was to create a guarantee of or
a right to lifelong anonymity for the birth parents. 294 Commentators
and courts reflecting on the earlier passage of laws prohibiting parties' general access to adoption records conveyed the impression not

291. See supra note 24.
292. See supra note 25.
293. Lessig, supra note 204, at 1013; see supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
294. See infra notes 356-88 and accompanying text. Other justifications advanced
today for prohibiting adult access to birth records are that: (1) the prohibition relieves
adoptive parents' fears that their children might, when they are grown, transfer their
affections to their birth parents; (2) in the absence of the prohibition, birth parents either will be discouraged from placing a child they would otherwise place for adoption,
or will be encouraged to abort; and (3) potential adoptive parents will be discouraged
from adopting. See Cole & Donley, supra note 287, at 292-93. It has also been argued
that open records would lead to "a very sharp drop in the number and quality of adoptive" parent applicants because they "are quick to recognize that opening the sealed
record changes their status from 'real' parents to that of long-term foster parents. The
perennial and endemic fear of adoptive parents, namely, that they will lose their child
to biological parents, will be enhanced and transformed into reality." Richard Zeilinger, The Need Vs. the Right to Know, 37 PUB. WELFARE, Summer 1979, at 44, 46. Opponents of the prohibition argue that in countries such as Great Britain and Israel and
in the states that permit adult access, the "dire consequences predicted as a result of
giving information have not occurred." Cole & Donley, supra note 287, at 293. As reported by a lawyer for the birth parents, adoptive parents, and adoptees involved in
the litigation over the Tennessee open records law, statistics in Kansas and Alaska,
where adoptees have long had access to birth records, show that adoption rates "have
been higher than those in the United States as a whole ... and abortion rates ... were
lower than in the United States as a whole." Greenman, supra note 24, at 4; see also
Jodi Nirode, Law Professor Pushes for Greater Access to Adoption Records, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, May 4, 2000, at 7C (discussing Joan Hollinger'S speech and adoption symposium at which it was delivered).
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only that these laws had provided some measure of anonymity for
birth parents but also that assuring lifelong anonymity had been one
of their primary goals. 295 The later closings of birth records to adult
adoptees, and all of the states' enactments of passive and active registry systems, reflected and fostered this more recent idea about lifelong secrecy in adoption. The social meanings associated with
adoptee interest in birth families remained negative, no longer because of adoptees' pathology but instead because such interest was
tied to and seen as an invasion of birth parents' interests.
The social revolution that challenged and threatened to undermine lifelong secrecy has included a lessening of the stigma of illegitimacy and a greater acceptance of single-parent and other nontraditional types of families. 296 With respect to attitudes about adoption, white unmarried motherhood is no longer equated with mental
disorder or an ability to recover easily from surrendering a child for
adoption. 297 A large majority of birth parents are reported to be open
to or actually desire contact with adoptees. 298 Adoptive families have
come increasingly to be seen as having unique qualities and challenges. 299 Thinking on human development has shifted back toward a
greater emphasis on nature. 300 Adoptees searching for information
about or contact with their birth families have become familiar figures 301 and are no longer assumed to be suffering from a mental disorder.302 Whether adoptees' expressed desires for identifying information is in any sense innate or instinctive, as some have argued,303 or is
purely culturally constructed,304 substantial and increasing numbers
of adult adoptees since the 1960s have sought information about

295. See infra notes 360-88 and accompanying text.
296. See infra notes 315-16 and accompanying text.
297. See Brodzinsky, supra note 247, at 300-04; infra notes 317-20 and accompanying text.
298. See infra notes 321-28 and accompanying text.
299. See infra notes 329-31 and accompanying text.
300. See infra notes 332-34 and accompanying text.
301. See infra notes 335-39 and accompanying text.
302. See infra notes 340-50 and accompanying text.
303. For example, psychiatrist Marshall D. Schechter and social worker Doris Bertocci have argued on the basis of their own and others' research that
[w lith the psychological need to separate pushed by the biological changes of
adolescence, the dissonances and differences for the adoptee are highlighted
and eventually create, in our view, a driven need to experience human connectedness. This craving grows with time, experienced subjectively by some
adoptees as equivalent to starvation .... The need to search has to do with a
craving, much of it having innate sources ....
Schechter & Bertocci, supra note 191, at 85; see also DAVID M. BRODZINSKY ET AL., BEING ADOPTED: THE LIFELONG SEARCH FOR SELF (1993).
304. See infra note 314.
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their birth parents. 305 A nationwide advocacy movement seeking
greater openness in adoption, including adult adoptee access to birth
records, has grown steadily from its beginnings in the late 1960s and
has involved both litigation and legislative advocacy.306 In the courts,
individuals have sought to establish good cause for opening records,ao7
and both individuals and groups have argued, without success to
date, that closed records violate their constitutional rights. 30S Mutual
aid networks of searching adoptees and birth relatives have also proliferated, expanding in recent years through the Internet. 309
Stories about searching and reuniting adoptees and birth relatives are frequently featured in books, newspapers, magazines, television programs, and movies. 3Io The movement for greater openness,
publicized and popularized in these ways, may be seen in effect, if not
necessarily in intent, as a means of changing the social understanding about lifelong secrecy by promoting changes in affiliated social
meanings. 3ll The evolution of social meaning is being affected by tying the act of seeking information to many sympathetic stories of individuals' searches and reunions,312 as well as to the broader and

305. As early as 1976, a Child Welfare League official wrote about the "growing
number" of adult adoptees "challenging the long·held practices for agency- and court·
sealed adoption records." Rebecca Smith, Editorial, The Sealed Adoption Record Con·
troversy and Social Agency Response, 55 CHILD WELFARE 73, 73 (1976). For a later report of growing interest, see, e.g., SACHDEV, supra note 263, at 2-3. There are no definitive statistics on the number or percentages of adolescent or adult adoptees who
have actively searched or contemplated searching, or who might search in a different
social and legal climate. Estimates of the percentage of adoptees who have searched or
have wished to search range from fifteen to thirty-five. See Schechter & Bertocci, supra note 191, at 67-68. A 1994 research report supported by the National Institute of
Mental Health found in its study of 715 adoptive families and their 881 adopted adolescents that "57% of the boys and 70% of the girls said they would like to meet their
birth parents some day," although "only 10% said they thought about them often or
would consider searching for them." 2 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 4, § 13.01[1]. The
methodology of the study has been criticized on a number of grounds, including a very
high rate of non-response from adoptive families asked to participate in the study. See
id.; March Wineman Axness, Growing Up Adopted: An Inquiry into Limitations, Interpretations, and Implications of the Search Institute's 1994 Adoptive Family Study, 16
DECREE (Am. Adoption Cong., Washington, D.C.), No.4, at 1 (1996).
306. For accounts at various times of this movement, see C. Wilson Anderson, The
Sealed Record in Adoption Controversy, 51 SOC. SERVICE REV. 141 (1977); Watson, supra note 230, at 13-14; Harrington, supra note 262; Thompson, supra note 227, at 13;
Watson, supra note 230, at 13-14.
307. See infra notes 380-400 and accompanying text.
308. For a recent review and analysis of constitutional arguments in support of
open records, see Cahn & Singer, supra note 34.
309. See supra notes 12, 280.
310. See infra notes 329-33 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 200-07 and accompanying text.
312. See Lessig, supra note 205, at 996-98.
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long-standing societal emphasis on genealogy.313 Positive stories
about adoptees and birth relatives searching for one another, as well
as the formation of large numbers of mutual support and advocacy
groups, are serving to lessen the social stigma and thus reduce the
social cose J4 individuals experience when they undertake searches.
Among the most dramatic aspects of the larger social revolution
are those associated with attitudes toward illegitimacy and singleparent families. The "steady decline" of "restrictive and moralistic social attitudes about unplanned pregnancy" has been attributed to
factors such as the "sexual revolution" of the 1960s, greater reproductive freedom, and the women's movement, as well as to an "increasing social regard for women," financial benefits for single mothers,
and an increase in the divorce rate that has made single-parent families more common. 315 A social work professor discussing adoption
practices in 1966 evoked these changes when she asked: "Is it possible that ... social workers have been insensitive to an evolving mood,
less condemnatory to the unmarried mother family? ... Is it possible,
in short, that social workers have been operating on the basis of a
presumed rather than a demonstrated need?,,316
According to professional literature concerning birth mothers, as
well as popular accounts both by and about them, many birth mothers who surrender children for adoption suffer long-term psychological consequences and many desire information about or contact with
their surrendered children. Studies and anecdotal evidence also suggest that high percentages of all birth parents are receptive to being
contacted by adult adoptees. With respect to the emotional lives of
birth mothers, a 1990 survey of psychological studies reported that
the studies' anecdotal data were "consistent with previous profes313. As sociologist Katarina Wegar observed about the widespread publicity for
adoption themes, particularly the theme of searching for birth parents, "[t]his publicity
is essential to the search movement: not only does it evoke sympathy and support, but
it promotes curiosity among adoptees about their biological origins." WEGAR, supra
note 34, at 72.
314. Wegar concluded that adoptees' "need to know [is] as much social as it is innate," and must be expected in our culture.
Considering the weight attributed to the biological underpinnings of parent-child relationships in this society, it is both cruel and unreasonable to
expect adoptees and their biological parents to feel otherwise.
Although arguments concerning the biological origins of the need to know
remain speculative, we can be sure that in this society knowledge about genetic heritage is generally regarded and experienced as an important part of
a person's identity, perhaps even as an archetypal yearning.
WEGAR, supra note 34, at 136-37.
315. Brodzinsky, supra note 247, at 298; see also NANCY E. Down, IN DEFENSE OF
SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES 103-16 (1977).
316. Madison, supra note 181, at 342. She even suggested that "[p]erhaps ... oneparent families could offer new hope for hard-to-place children." Id. at 347.
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sional documentation of profound and protracted grief reactions, depression, and an enduring preoccupation with and worry about the
welfare of the child .... These findings strongly suggest[ed] that, for
many women, the experience of surrendering an infant for adoption
is a nearly intolerable 10ss."317 Women who adoption agency personnel
had assumed could "put the experience behind them"31B later began
"to emerge from long years of silence to express sorrow, anger, and
regret."319 They explained "their previous reluctance to come forward
as the outcome of both spoken and unspoken prohibitions coming
from adoption caseworkers, family members, mental health workers,
the religious community, and society in general."320
A number of small studies in the 1970s suggested that a substantial majority of birth parents who had been located by their surrendered children were accepting of being found. The studies also
showed that a substantial majority of uncontacted birth parents
would be willing to meet their children. 321 These studies were cited to
and reported by authors of legal periodical articles favoring greater
openness in adoption.322 A sizeable study published in 1989 found
evidence "shattering the prevailing myth that birth mothers are unconcerned about the child they relinquished .... [E]y and large birth
mothers feel a continuing sense of loss and would like to reunite with
their child .... "323 Almost ninety percent of the birth mothers studied
favored being contacted on behalf of their surrendered children. 324
Recently, statistics compiled by intermediary programs have indi-

317. Brodzinsky, supra note 247, at 304; see also, e.g., Loverett Millen & Samuel
Roll, Solomon's Mothers: A Special Case of Pathological Bereavement, 55 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 411 (1985). For autobiographical accounts, see, e.g., MERRY BLOCH
JONES, BIRTHMOTHERS (1993); CAROL SCHAEFER, THE OTHER MOTHER: A WOMAN'S
LOVE FOR THE CHILD SHE GAVE UP FOR ADOPTION (1991).
318. Brodzinsky, supra note 247, at 295.
319. Id. at 298-99.
320. Id.
321. See LAURIE WISHARD & WILLIAM R. WISHARD, ADOPTION: THE GRAFTED TREE
166 (1979) (referring to a 1976 study stating that eighty-two percent of birth parents
would be willing to meet with adult adoptees); Arthur D. Sorosky et aI., The Effects of
the Sealed Record in Adoption, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 900,901 (1976) (stating that in
a survey of fifty adult adoptees, eighty-two percent of birth parents were "positive and
accepting," and only ten percent reacted "adversely" to the reunion with their surrendered children); Thompson, supra note 227, at 14 ("[C]ontrary to commonly expressed
fears, most birth families were reasonably accepting of being found.").
322. See, e.g., Hanley, supra note 272, at 547-48; Elton B. Klibanofl; Genealogical
Information in Adoption: The Adoptee's Quest and the Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 185, 195
(1977) (stating that in searches initiated by birth parents, "studies indicate that most
biological mothers say they would be willing to participate in a future meeting with
the child ifit would be helpful to the child's welfare").
323. SACHDEV, supra note 263, at 178.
324. Id.
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cated that as many as ninety-five percent of birth parents are open to
contact. 325 In Hawaii, an intermediary in the state's active registry
system reported in 1992 that when she contacts birth parents, "the
most typical reaction ... is great joy, crying, and 'This is the call I've
been waiting for.",326 These themes of the continuing concern experienced by many birth parents, and their desire for or acceptance of
contact with their adult children, are prominent in popular accounts
of birth mothers' experiences such as Carol Shaefer's autobiographical work, The Other Mother,327 which was made into a television
movie, and the study, BirthBond, which documented birth mothers'
reunions with their children. 328
The formation of families through adoption is no longer seen in
the professional literature as a perfect and complete substitute for
creating families through childbirth. "The traditional view held that
adoption emulated the genetic birth experience. The adopted child
was indistinguishable from children born to a family .... The emerging view[] holds that adoption is a unique, life long experience, not to
be confused with genetic experience."329 Adopted children have to cope
with "the reality that they have two families," and "[a]doptive parents are encouraged to join their children in dealing with this fact
and to use the process to increase their attachment to the children
they have adopted."330 Commenting as early as 1974 on a trend toward greater openness, a Child Welfare editorial opined that "[t]he
325. In litigation over the Tennessee open records law, birth parents, adoptive parents, and adoptees who defended the law used statistics compiled by confidential intermediary programs to offer evidence that ninety-five percent of birth parents wanted
to be contacted by their children. See Greenman, supra note 24, at 3 (stating that the
figures were also confirmed by Connecticut Law Revision Commission data); see also
G. William Troxler, Human Rights & Responsibilities in Adoption, available at
http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org/regional.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2001).
Troxler stated that New Jersey officials reported 94.9% of 350 living birth family
members contacted in a four-year period wanted contact if adoptees requested it. Id. In
4097 contacts with birth mothers between 1981 and 1996, 7.5% refused contact with
adoptees. Id. The South Dakota state official who assisted adoptees seeking identifying
information reported in an interview that no problems have arisen there after
adoptees received information. She said adoptees have been cautious and considerate
in their use of the information and in their approaches to birth relatives. See Telephone Interview with Kleinsasser, supra note 71.
326. Lum, supra note 57, at 519. The searcher estimated that "less than five percent
of birthparents immediately relay (over the telephone) a desire to remain confidential.
Moreover, in the majority of the cases, after the initial shock wears off, the birthparent
changes his or her mind." Id.
327. SCHAEFER, supra note 317.
328. JUDITH S. GEDIMAN & LINDA P. BROWN, BIRTHBoND: REUNIONS BETWEEN
BIRTHPARENTS AND ADOPTEES-WHAT HAPPENS AFTER ... (1989) (providing first-hand
accounts of the experiences shared by birthmothers).
329. Cole & Donley, supra note 287, at 280.
330. Id.
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creation of families based on psychological, not blood, ties contains
inherent identity problems that practice and law seek to mitigate but
can never eliminate."331 The human development pendulum also
changed direction, swinging somewhat further away from nurture
and closer to nature. 332 Whereas studies of adoptee adjustment in the
late 1940s through the early 1960s concentrated on "environmental
factors ... almost to the exclusion of genetic factors," since the mid1960s "interest [has] swung toward elucidation of genetic factors in
adoptee psychopathology (and by extension to adoptee adjustment)."333 A psychiatrist reviewing this more recent professional literature concluded, "[t]he older view that children are a 'tabula rasa'
as far as behavior, socialization, and the like are concerned would
appear to be invalid."334
The image of adoptees searching for information about or contact
with their birth families has become a more familiar one and is no
longer assumed to indicate mental disorder or even dissatisfaction
with the adoption experience. 335 In the 1960s and 1970s, autobiographical and journalistic accounts "developed momentum in the
popular literature."336 A plethora of autobiographical books and articles have chronicled searches for and reunions with biological relatives, from Jean Paton's, Florence Fisher's, and Betty Jean Lifton's
groundbreaking books in the 1950s and 1960s,337 to recent accounts
such as one by writer and former NFL star Tim Green. 338 As sociologist Katarina Wegar notes, "[t]he adoption theme, particularly the
theme of searching for birth parents, has emerged as a compelling
human-interest story and has inspired myriad novels, plays, and
movies. "339
331. Carl Schoenberg, On Adoption and Identity, 53 CHILD WELFARE 549 (1974).
332. See, e.g., Helen Cominos, Minimizing the Risks of Adoption Through Knowl·
edge, 16 Soc. WORK 73, 79 (1971) (arguing that adoptive parents have a right to information about adoptees' heredity in order to minimize the risks they are expected to
take).
333. Remi J. Cadoret, Biologic Perspectives of Adoptee Adjustment, in THE PSy·
CHOLOGY OF ADOPTION, supra note 191, at 25, 28-29.
334. Id. at 39. The author continued: "Not that environment is unimportant. It demonstrably is important and hopefully, with the aid of studies of adoptees, the role of
environment (as well as genetics) in human behavior will continue to be clarified further." Id. at 39-40.
335. See, e.g., Schechter & Bertocci, supra note 191, at 62-90.
336. [d. at 66.
337. See supra note 263.
338. TIM GREEN, A MAN AND HIS MOTHER: AN ADOPTED SON'S SEARCH (1997).
339. WEGAR, supra note 34, at 72. As early as 1979, it was noted that "[i]n the past
few years there has been an increasing number of newspaper and magazine articles
dealing with the adoptee's wish to know about and possibly to find his family of birth.
T.V. and films, sensing the emotional pull of the topic, have used the theme frequently." Thompson, supra note 228, at 13.
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In the 1970s, authoritative voices began characterizing adoptees'
interest in their birth families as both normal and perhaps even important to satisfy. An academic observer in 1977 reported that
"[ w]hile the effort to gain access to the sealed record in adoption has
been initiated and sustained by adoptees themselves, support for
their efforts has emerged from both social work and the law."34o A
committee of the American Academy of Pediatrics reported in 1971
"evidence that the adopted child retains the need for seeking his ancestry for a long time."341 Influential articles were published in the
1970s by a team of researchers-two social workers and a psychiatrist: Annette Baran, Reuben Pannor, and Arthur D. Sorosky. They
advocate open records in their work, arguing that adoptees are especially vulnerable to identity conflicts, that closed records lead to psychological problems, and that successful searches benefit most of the
adoptees who conduct them as well as their birth parents. 342 Similarly, a mid-1970s Canadian study stated that "an adoptee's need to
know about his or her birth family was a normal and natural piece of
the adoption phenomenon and was not restricted to those adoptees
who [have] had unhappy adoption experiences."343 Editorials in the
Child Welfare League of America's publication counseled that the
sealed records controversy must be viewed with an open mind that
considers "the possibility that adult adoptees may be right in demanding elimination of secrecy."344 Further, in light of the existence,
inter alia, of inherent identity problems and the discontent of some
adult adoptees, a day might come when almost all adoptions would
be open from the outset. 345 Also in the mid-1970s, a study of adopted
persons in Scotland ,346 where birth records had been open since
1930,347 influenced the passage in 1975348 of a law that opened records

340. Anderson, supra note 306, at 143.
341. Prager & Rothstein, supra note 101, at 140 n.18 (citing Comm. on Adoptions,
Am. Academy of Pediatrics, Identity Development in Adopted Children, 47 PEDIATRICS
948 (1971)).
342. See, e.g., SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 267; Baran et ai., supra note 266; Baran
et ai., Open Adoption, SOC. WORK 97 (1976); Sorosky et ai., supra note 321. For a discussion of their work and influence, see CARP, supra note 5, at 148.
343. Thompson, supra note 227, at 14.
344. Smith, supra note 305, at 74.
345. See Schoenberg, supra note 331, at 549.
346. TRISELIOTIS, supra note 188.
347. See id. at 1.
348. See Carolyn Burke, Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know
His Origins, 48 So. CAL. L. REV. 1196, 1203-04 (1975) (stating that because of a study
done in Scotland, a legislative committee drafted recommendations to revise laws in
England and Wales to allow adoptees to receive "a copy of[theirl original birth certificate" at age eighteen).
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in England and Wales as well. 349 Today, social service and other social
science literature continues not to speak in terms of pathology. A review of more recent studies of searching adoptees showed instead
merely disagreement about whether "the need to search is found predominantly among adoptees with unsatisfactory adoptive experiences," and "agreement that when a search is completed it usually results in significantly improved psychological changes within the
adoptee."35o
In "the growing number of articles favorable to the adoptee's
quest" that began to appear in law periodicals in the 1970s,351 legal
commentators noted adoptees' growing interest in and advocacy for
obtaining identifying information, as well as the increasing media attention paid to the issue. 352 The authors premised their analyses on
the notions that the interest of many adoptees in identifying information is natural and that the inability to satisfy that interest can
lead to psychological difficulties. As one wrote, "There is growing recognition that adoptees feel a greater lack of biological continuity than
has been previously accepted, and that these feelings cannot be discounted as occurring only in maladjusted or emotionally disturbed
individuals."353 With respect to the effect of sealed records on adult
adoptees, a Maryland judge explained that the "wellspring of the attack on sealed record statutes lies in the growing recognition of psychological impairment occasioned by the denial of access to information regarding birth origin."354 A Midwestern practitioner described

349. Children Act, 1975, c. 72 (Eng.) (allowing adoptees at age eighteen to obtain
birth records).
350. Schechter & Bertocci, supra note 191, at 71 (emphasis added).
351. Anderson, supra note 306, at 143.
352. See, e.g., James J. Bianco Jr. et ai., The New Hampshire Adoption Statute: An
Overview, 18 NEW HAMpSHIRE B.J. 199, 225-26, 229 (1977) (discussing the increasing
interest of adoptees in the search movement); Klibanoff, supra note 322, at 186 (commenting on the media attention and the movement for and against open records);
Burke, supra note 348, at 1196-97 (identifying an increase in searching, advocacy, and
publicity); Carter, supra note 274, at 837 (noting an increase in adoptees seeking access to records); Ruth Clement Scheppers, Comment, Discovery Rights of the AdopteePrivacy Rights of the Natural Parent: A Constitutional Dilemma, 4 SAN FERN. V. L.
REV. 65 (1975) (discussing the movement for open records).
353. Scheppers, supra note 352, at 68; see also, e.g., Burke, supra note 348, at 1196
(stating the compelling psychological need of many to learn natural heritage); Lupack,
supra note 66, at 219, 228 (discussing the deep-seated need of many to learn identity).
354. Marshall A. Levin, The Adoption Trilemma: The Adult Adoptee's Emerging
Search for His Ancestral Identity, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 496, 498-99 (1979); see also, e.g.,
Hanley, supra note 272, at 546 (noting the possibility of an identity crisis due to lack of
knowledge); Lupack, supra note 66, at 218-19 (acknowledging that a lack of knowledge
can impede identity development); Prager & Rothstein, supra note 101, at 139 (discussing the serious psychological problems).
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some adoptees' "years of agonizing searching and depression."355
Despite these changing popular and professional views of
adoptees' seeking information, the social understanding of lifelong
secrecy as an essential feature of adoption persisted and states continued to close birth records to adult adoptees. Observing the phenomenon of a state closing birth records in this period, one article in
1977 puzzled, "it is surprising Connecticut would change its law in
light of the current mode of openness with respect to adoptive records .... Connecticut has reported ... very few problems with prospective adoptive parents because of the openness of the statute."356
An earlier article reported that "no problems resulted to either the
adopted person or his natural parents following the disclosure of the
latter's identity."357 But the threatened understanding about lifelong
secrecy was being shored up by a contemporarily plausible rationale.
In what can be seen as reflecting a "defensive construction"358 of a social understanding and its affiliated social meanings, judicial opinions and legal commentaries conveyed the impression that, as a rule,
the prohibitions on parties' access to records and adult adoptees' access to birth records occurred simultaneously. They indicated that
these measures were undertaken to guarantee birth parents' lifelong
anonymity, as well as for other reasons such as the need to protect
the adoptive family from potential interference by birth parents.
Therefore, adoptee interest in birth families seriously impinged on
birth parents' interests. Lifelong secrecy had become so entrenched
in the 1970s that the rhetoric and reasoning of most judicial opinions
and legal periodical articles made it seem as if there had never been
a time when a chorus of expert voices recommended sealing records
but allowing adult adoptees access to original birth records. These
opinions and commentaries made it seem as if there had never been
long periods in many states, only recently concluded in some and ongoing in others, when the recommendation for allowing adult
adoptees access had been followed without apparent harm either to
individuals or to the institution of adoption. 359
The legal commentaries typically discussed the closing of adoption records as a unitary event, without acknowledging distinctions
among agency, court, and birth records. One article explained that
"the practice of closing the records was initiated, and procedures
355. C.L. Gaylord, The Adoptive Child's Right to Know, CASE & COMMENT, Mar.Apr. 1976, at 38, 44 (asserting adopted children should have a legal right to inquire
into their origin).
356. Bianco et al., supra note 352, at 231.
357. Prager & Rothstein, supra note 101, at 150 (citing a letter from a state
adoption official).
358. Lessig, supra note 204; see supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
359. See infra notes 360-400 and accompanying text.
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were started to protect the privacy and permanency of the adoption
process. Records ... became available to adopted persons to see only
if reasonable cause could be shown."36o One comment noted that "a
major purpose of the confidentiality statutes [was] to keep the identity of the biological parents secret."361 An influential 1977 article in
the Family Law Quarterly referred to "decades of policy protecting
the anonymity of the biological parents."362 Authors based the analyses in their articles on the existence of a general "right to anonymity,"363 "guarantee of anonymity,"364 and "right to remain anonymous."365 Authors stated without citation or further explanation that
many mothers "relinquished their children with a clear assurance of
anonymity."366 Nevertheless, some of the authors concluded that a
right of access for adult adoptees, based on either a constitutional
right or a statutory right, should trump desires for, expectations of,
or rights to anonymity on the part of birth parents and a corresponding state interest in sparing birth parents from distressing or disruptive reunions. 367 Some authors recommended systems in which intermediaries would obtain information and make contacts. 36S
In the reported opinions concerning secrecy in adoption that began appearing in the 1970s,369 the courts also wrote in terms of birth
parents' "right to privacy"37o and "statutory guarantee of anonymity
and confidentiality."371 Opinions discussed the development of secrecy
among the parties as a single legal event intended to promote the interests of all the members of the adoption triangle-adoptees, adoptive parents, and birth parents-and the derivative interests of the
360. Bianco et aI., supra note 352.
361. Carter, supra note 274, at 845.
362. Klibanoff, supra note 322, at 196 (emphasis added).
363. Prager & Rothstein, supra note 101, at 148.
364. Klibanoff, supra note 322, at 195.
365. Bianco et aI., supra note 352, at 233-34.
366. Scheppers, supra note 352, at 76.
367. See, e.g., Gaylord, supra note 355, at 44; Burke, supra note 348, at 1197; Lupack, supra note 66, at 217; Jackie L. Payne Sr., Note, Adoptees: Have We Forgotten
that They Are Human Also?, 4 S.U. L. REV. 104, 113 (1977) (advocating open records
laws); Prager & Rothstein, supra note 101, at 144-49 (stating that there may be a constitutional right to know).
368. See, e.g., Hanley, supra note 272, at 553; Klibanoff, supra note 322, at 197-98;
Carter, supra note 274, at 852-53.
369. See generally Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Restricting Access to Judicial Records of Concluded Adoption Proceedings, 83 A.L.R.3d 800 (1978).
370. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) (holding statute that placed birth certificates under seal did not violate adoptees' rights to privacy, to receive important information, or to equal protection).
371. In re Sage, 586 P.2d 1201, 1203, 1205 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (denying adult
adoptees' motion to inspect adoption records).
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society in an effective and lawful adoption system. As a Rhode Island
court typically outlined, in a case in which a birth mother sought information about her eleven-year-old child, lifelong secrecy gives the
birth parent "assurance that his or her identity will not become public knowledge" and "an opportunity to restructure his or her life after
a most traumatic episode."372 It allows adoptive parents to raise the
child "free from interference from the natural parents and without
any apprehension that the birth status of their child will be used to
harm themselves or the child."373 It "protects the adoptee from any
possible stain of illegitimacy and permits the formation of a relationship with the new parents ... free of the threat of outside interference" of a birth parent. 374
Rejecting adoptees' constitutional challenges to sealed records,
some courts suggested, to the contrary, that the states' important interest in protecting the privacy of birth parents might itself be "compelling" in constitutional terms. 375 Even in a state in which birth records had been available to adult adoptees until two years earlier,
the Louisiana Supreme Court stressed in 1979 that the court, rather
than the adoptee, should undertake inquiries concerning whether he
had a right to inherit from "blood relatives" because, among other
reasons, it could be that the birth parents were "assured of permanent anonymity" and "that either or both may have a right to personal privacy which includes a right to remain anonymous."376 Courts
also articulated related societal concerns that granting access to
identifying information to adult adoptees could somehow reduce the
availability of adoptive families or drive birth parents either to keep
their children or resort to abandonment or black market transactions, in situations in which the best interest of the children would be
served by lawful adoption proceedings.377 A dissenter in the Louisiana
case, however, did observe that "for several decades an adoptive child
has had the right to learn his parentage (before the recent 1977
amendments to the statute), without noticeable effect on inhibiting
adoptions."378 "[I]t might be argued," the justice added, "that the social values involved in protecting the anonymity of the blood parents

372. In re Christine, 397 A.2d 511, 513 (R.I. 1979); see also Sage, 586 P.2d at 120304; Bradey v. Children's Bureau, 274 S.E.2d 418, 421 (S.C. 1981) (denying adult
adoptees' motion to unseal records for failure to show good cause).
373. In re Christine, 397 A.2d at 513.
374. See id.
375. ALMA Soc'y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1236 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that
sealed records law was not unconstitutional).
376. Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (La. 1979).
377. See, e.g., In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978); Bradey, 274 S.E.2d at
421.
378. Massey, 369 So. 2d at 1316 n.2 (Tate, J., dissenting).
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are adequately served by preserving their identity for the first
twenty years of their child's life."379
Whether deciding adoptees' petitions to open records for good
cause or adoptees' claims of constitutional rights, the courts spoke in
terms of weighing the interests of adoptees against a privacy interest
of birth relatives,38o although no statutes required notice to or a hearing for birth relatives before opening records. The weighing process
is, of course, a peculiar one in which the courts compare the interests
of persons before the court with interests of unknown, unrepresented
persons who, as some opinions recognized, might not object to the release of information or might even joyfully welcome a reunion. 381 Perhaps one of the only state statutes that suggested the possibility of
locating and consulting birth parents was New York's provision that
court records could be opened "for good cause shown after due notice
has been given to 'the adoptive parents and to such additional persons as the court may direct."'382 The New York Court of Appeals held
that birth parents should be sought by the court only if a petitioning
adoptee has first shown good cause for opening the records and if
"the natural parents can be located with reasonable effort and in a
manner that will not be likely to be self-defeating by revealing their
identities to the adoptive parents or others."383 If these conditions
were satisfied, then notice to the birth parents would provide them
"an opportunity to intervene through a representative ... and defend
their interest in retaining anonymity."384 Courts in Louisiana, Missouri, and Rhode Island also approved the use of intermediaries to

379. Id.
380. See In re Linda F.M., 401 N.Y.S.2d 960, 962 (Sur. Ct. 1978) (holding that suit
tq.unseal records may proceed even without notice to birth parents if birth parents are
not easily accessible and noting in dicta that the presence ofthe Attorney General provides an adequate adversarial atmosphere); Mellon, 601 F.2d at 1236; Massey, 369
So.2d at 1314-15; In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 763; Bradey, 274 S.E.2d at 421; Mills,
372 A.2d at 651; In re Sage, 586 P.2d at 1204.
381. See, e.g., Mellon, 601 F.2d at 1236; In re Linda F.M., 401 N.Y.S.2d at 962; In re
Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1389 (R.I. 1986) (holding that adoptee's curiosity about natural parents was not good cause for opening sealed records).
382. In re Anonymous, 399 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (Sur. Ct. 1977) (quoting N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAw § 114(2) (McKinney 1999) (holding that good cause was shown when information was necessary to adult adoptee's mental rehabilitation); see also supra note 85
(citing 1974 Connecticut statute, which provided for showing good cause "ex parte or
with such notice the court deems advisable").
383. In re Linda F.M., 418 N.E.2d at 1304.
384. Id. (citation omitted). The decision appeared to overrule the procedure used by
a surrogate court in an earlier case in which the court, without first requiring a good
cause showing, ordered an investigation to locate the birth mother and determine
whether she would be willing to see her daughter. See In re Maxtone-Graham, 393
N.Y.S.2d 835, 836-37 (Sur. Ct. 1975) (allowing disclosure of agency records where
natural mother had consented).
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contact birth parents in cases in which good cause was first demonstrated. 385 The Missouri Supreme Court observed that "[i]t is difficult
to perceive a case in which circumstances would warrant disclosure ... unless" the birth parent has waived the confidentiality of the
records. 386 Most courts simply weighed the interests of adoptees seeking identifying information against a presumed interest of birth parents in anonymity. The Illinois Supreme Court, for example, in a decision rejecting a constitutional challenge to the state's sealed records
laws, found "that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that [the adoptee's] desire to obtain release of the records
should not prevail over the potential infringement of the rights of
other parties."387 In that case, the adoptee's adoptive mother supported his search; his adoptive sister had searched for, found, and
was enjoying relationships with both her families; and his adoption
had taken place in 1949, twelve years before Illinois closed original
birth records to adult adoptees. 388
The courts also faced the difficult task, with essentially no guidance from state legislatures, of divining what might constitute good
cause for revealing information in sealed records. The history and
analysis presented in this Article confirm that when many of the record-sealing laws were passed, legislators neither sought to remedy
problems associated with adult adoptee access to identifying information nor specifically considered whether or why adult adoptees would
seek or should be entitled to information. Some state statutes provided no standard for opening court or birth records; some required
"good cause" for court records but enunciated no standard for opening
birth records. 389 In the absence of any standard, courts interpreted
statutes as requiring good cause. 390 A few statutes supplied other
385. See, e.g., Massey, 369 So. 2d at 1314-15 (finding the right to inherit from blood
relative to be compelling reason for a curator ad hoc to investigate birth records, and
that birth parents may be indispensable parties); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 766 (authorizing a confidential inquiry when factual situation justifies an opportunity to participate anonymously in proceeding); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d at 1390 (finding that if
adoptee had shown compelling need and connection of psychological problems to lack
of information, birth parents must have opportunity to intervene). In New Jersey, a
1977 decision of the superior court, chancery division, outlined a procedure for contacting birth parents in every case, but a later decision of the same court declined to follow
the earlier case. Backes v. Catholic Family & Cmty. Servs., 509 A.2d 283, 294 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (finding no showing of good cause).
386. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 766.
387. In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 757 (Ill. 1981) (holding that sealing statute was
constitutional because it was rationally related to the legitimate legislative interest of
protecting adoption and it did not violate the adoptee's constitutional rights).
388. See In re Roger B., 407 N.E.2d 884, 886, 890 n.7 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980), affd, 418
N.E.2d 751 (Ill. 1981).
389. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 752-53; Backes, 509 A.2d at 291 n.2.
390. "The statute, unlike those of several other States does not explicitly provide a
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types of minimal guidance, such as providing that records may be inspected or information disclosed "only ... when the court is satisfied
that the welfare of the child will thereby be promoted or protected,"391
or if it is in "the best interest of the child or of the public" to do SO.392
The courts themselves did not develop many more concrete guidelines. As one judge commented, "judicial considerations by other
courts as to 'sealed records' statutes are limited and of little help."393
Another explained that "[t]here is no precise definition of 'good cause'
either by statute or case law, rather, the judge must make this determination on a case-by-case basis. Flexibility is desirable in this
sensitive area. The court is vested with wide discretion .... "394 In
keeping with the social understanding that lifelong secrecy is an essential feature of adoption, courts in reported opinions uniformly rejected "mere curiosity,"395 however keen, and found few specific reasons that did or might constitute good cause. Among the reasons a
small number of appellate courts accepted were a psychological need
to knoW,a95 or more commonly, severe psychological problems caused
by lack of information;397 a right to inherit from natural relatives;398
and a religiously based need to trace ancestors.399 References to trial
court orders that released identifying information can be found in a
number of opinions and other sources, but the reasons for and the
numbers of such orders cannot be determined. 40o
In the social service arena, there has been discussion since the
good-cause standard .... Although we find no Illinois cases interpreting the standard
to be applied, we agree that the discretion conferred by the statute was intended to be
exercised upon a showing of good cause." In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 752-53 (citation
omitted); see also Harrington, supra note 262, at 30 & n.2.
391. In re Wells, 281 F.2d 68,70 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (quoting relevant statute prohibiting inspection of sealed records except upon court's finding that the welfare of child
would be protected or promoted).
392. In re Spinks, 232 S.E.2d 479,481 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (quoting relevant statute and finding that the best interests of the child were not adequately considered).
393. Id. at 482.
394. Sage, 586 P.2d at 1206.
395. See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 655; In re Linda F.M., 409 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
396. See, e.g., Estate of Dodge v. Comerica Bank, 413 N.W.2d 449, 584 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1987) (finding a psychological need entitled adoptee to hearing on issue of opening records).
397. See, e.g., Assalone, 512 A.2d at 1388-89.
398. See, e.g., Massey, 369 So. 2d at 1314.
399. See In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Mo. 1978) (holding that religious need
could be good cause sufficient to open records). For a general discussion of reported
and unreported "good cause" cases decided in the 1970s, see Harrington, supra note
262. For a discussion of such cases up to the present time, see Karnezis, supra note
369.
400. See, e.g., Rossignol v. Comm'r of Human Servs., 495 A.2d 788, 789 (Me. 1985)
(denying motion for further inspection after adult adoptee had already ascertained
identity of birth mother); Sorosky et aI., supra note 267, at 151.
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1960s about promises or assurances made by agencies to unmarried
mothers that identifying information about them would not be revealed in the future to the children they surrendered for adoption.
These discussions pertain generally to social workers' professional
confidentiality standards and practices with respect to their own records,401 although it is certainly possible some agencies or other intermediaries had made representations about laws governing court
and birth records laws. In a 1975 article, a professor of social work
recounted that unmarried mothers did not anticipate that the surrendered child would be re-introduced into her life "at some unpredictable time.''402 Discussing the possibility of agencies providing information in the future to adult adoptees, she continued, "[m]others
who have already given their children up for adoption have been
given assurances about privacy and confidentiality that must be respected.''403 A 1975 Child Welfare League survey of adoption agencies
asked what should be done if a choice had to be made between a
"[b]iological mother's right to anonymity" and an "[a]dult adoptee's
right to know who was his or her biological mother." Fifty-seven percent of the agencies said they would consider the mother's right
paramount, while 27% would consider the adoptee's paramount, and
16% "didn't know." Respondents were more divided on the normative
question of whether agencies ideally should conduct a search for biological parents on the adoptee's behalf (14% usually, 53% sometimes,
19% never), or simply give the adoptee identifying information (9%
usually, 40% sometimes, and 34% never).404
The League's 1978 revision of its standards continued to support
sealed adoption records,405 although by 1988, it was advising agencies
to advocate both for laws shifting the burden of proof from adoptees
to birth parents and for laws under which adult adoptees could be
given information either after birth parents' consent is obtained or
after a diligent but unsuccessful search for the birth parents. 406 Then
in 2000, recognizing that "[a]doption practice has changed significantly"407 since the publication of the previous standards, the League
401. See generally Marianne Bower Blair, The Uniform Adoption Act's Health Dis·
closure Provisions: A Model that Should Not Be Overlooked, 30 FAM. L.Q. 427, 455
(1996).
402. Rita Dukette, Perspectives for Agency Response to the Adoption·Record Contro·
versy, 54 CHILD WELFARE 545,547 (1975).
403. [d. at 553.
404. MARy ANN JONES, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., THE SEALED ADOPTION
RECORD CONTROVERSY: REPORT OF A SURVEY OF AGENCY POLICY, PRACTICE AND OPINIONS 21-23 (1976).
405. CARP, supra note 5, at 175.
406. [d. at 194.
407. Child Welfare League of Am., CWLA Standards of Excellence for Adoption Services, available at http://www.cwla.org/programs/adoption/cwla_standards.htm (last
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advised agencies to promote policies that provide adopted adults with
direct access to identifying information. 40B Twenty years earlier, an
advisory panel of the Children's Bureau recommended a model state
adoption act under which adult adoptees would have access to birth
and court records. 409 After receiving negative comments on the act,
including objections to the open records provisions from ninety percent of commenting adoptive parents, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare promulgated a model act that dealt only with
the adoption of children with special needs and did not include the
open records provisions. 4lO Perhaps social service workers and policymakers have supported greater openness than states have afforded
because of those professionals' familiarity with emerging thinking in
their fields as well as their direct involvement with adult adoptees,
adoptive parents, and birth parents.
State laws passed after the 1960s establishing passive and active
registries of course reflect and reinforce the idea that the purpose of
lifelong secrecy is to protect birth parents' right to anonymity and
that therefore identifying information should not be available to
adult adoptees without the consent of the birth parent whose identity
will be revealed. In Connecticut, for example, two years after closing
birth records to adult adoptees, the legislature created an elaborate
system under which an adult adoptee could petition a court for identifying information, and receive such information after an agency investigation and report to the court, if the birth parents gave written
consent and if the court did not determine that the release of the information would be "seriously disruptive" or endanger the health of
the adoptee or birth parents. If the birth parents could not be found,
a guardian ad litem was to be appointed who could consent on their
behalf.411 The recent state laws that have prospectively established
access to birth records412 also reflect the idea that, at least in adoptions completed before or during the period when birth records were
closed to adoptees, there is a pre-existing right to lifelong anonymity
that must be preserved.
The fact that states have moved so cautiously toward opening
birth records, notwithstanding revolutionary social change and the
efforts of open records advocates, is likely due in part to the power
and persistence of the social understanding about lifelong secrecy
visited Feb. 15, 2001).
408. [d.
409. Model State Adoption Act and Model State Adoption Procedures: Recommen·
dations of the Model Adoption Legislation and Procedures Advisory Panel, 45 Fed.
Reg. 10,622, 10,686·89 (Feb. 15, 1980).
410. CARP, supra note 5, at 187·88.
411. 1977 Conn. Pub. Acts 77·246.
412. See supra note 25.
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and its affiliated meanings. The three states that in very recent years
have re-established unrestricted access to birth records-Tennessee,
Oregon, and Alabama413-have responded to open record advocates'
arguments that states' passive and active registries are ineffective,
demean adult adoptees, and do not remedy the fundamental denial of
adoptees' right to the kind of basic information about oneself that is
available to all other persons. Reunion rates achieved through state
and local passive registries are low, ranging, by one estimate, from a
high of 4.4% to a median of 2.05%, with the lack of higher rates attributed to factors such as being "under-funded [and] understaffed."414 Efforts in the United States Congress to establish a nationwide passive registry have so far been unsuccessful. 415 Beyond the
criticism that these registries are ineffective, other objections include
the view that both passive and active registries are psychologically
unhelpful to the adult adoptee. The systems "abrogate one of the
most fundamental principles of social work practice, selfdetermination. Under such systems the locus of control, which the
search serves to remedy, remains outside the adoptee, thereby keeping her in a position of passivity and dependence."416 In addition, the
"assumption that reunions mediated by adoption workers have better
outcomes than reunions worked out solely by the adoptee and birthparent themselves" is criticized as "unsupportable."417
Tennessee's and Oregon's open records laws have been challenged and upheld in cases in which opponents have argued that the
measures violate federal and state constitutions. The Oregon law,
passed as a ballot initiative in 1998, provides that adoptees age
twenty-one and older may receive copies of their original birth certificates upon request.4lB Under the law, a birth parent may file a
413. See supra note 23.
414. Troxler, supra note 325. For example, in the first twelve years of Illinois's passive registry, there were reportedly only twenty-eight matches. Heidi Hildebrand, Because They Want to Know: An Examination of the Legal Rights of Adoptees and Their
Parents, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 515, 515 n.3 (2000) (citing Adrienne Drell, Opening the
Books on Adoption, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at 6); see also Alan W. Strasser,
Adoption Search and Registry Laws of Vermont and New York: Whose Best Interest Is
Being Served?, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 669, 708-09 (1994) (discussing the changing societal attitudes toward biological mothers and the supporting laws that facilitate
adoptees' searches for their biological families).
415. See supra note 12.
416. Schechter & Bertocci, supra note 191, at 88.
417. Id. The authors recommend that adoptees have personal access to the "information within the context of an encounter with an adopteeadvocate rather than in the
context of 'counseling.'" Id.
418. See Does v. State, 993 P.2d 822, 825 (Or. Ct. App. 1999), rev. denied, 6 P.3d
1098 (Or. 2000), stay denied, 530 U.S. 1228 (2000). The Oregon House of Representatives passed the bill to complement the enactment. H.B. 3194, 70th Leg. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Or. 1999).
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"Contact Preference Form" indicating whether. the birth parent
would like to be contacted, would prefer to be contacted through an
intermediary, or would prefer not to be contacted "at this time."419
The Oregon courts held that under state and federal constitutions,
the law neither unconstitutionally impairs the obligation of contract
nor invades a guaranteed privacy right.420 Oregon's adoption laws
never "prevented all dissemination of information concerning the
identities of birth mothers. At no time in Oregon's history have the
adoption laws required the consent of, or even notice to, a birth
mother on the opening of adoption records or sealed birth certificates."421 A birth mother does not have "a fundamental right to give
birth to a child and then have someone else assume legal responsibility for that child.... Adoption necessarily involves a child that already has been born, and a birth is, and historically has been, essentially a public event."422 By the time the Oregon litigation was concluded in 2000, more than 2,000 requests for birth records had been
filed. 423
The Tennessee statute, passed in 1995, provides adoptees
twenty-one years of age and older with a right of access to birth records, as well as to court and agency records. 424 The law responds to
concerns about birth parents' privacy with a "contact veto" mechanism for adoptions that took place after the date on which adult
adoptee access to birth records was prohibited. Birth parents and
specified other relatives may register their willingness or unwillingness to have contact with an adoptee who obtains his or her records. 425 Contact initiated in violation of a veto is a misdemeanor and
subjects the contacting party to a civil suit for injunctive relief and
damages. 426 Opponents of the Tennessee law argued unsuccessfully in
federal court that the law violates constitutional rights of birth
419. H.B. 3194, 70th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1999).
420. Does, 993 P.2d at 833-34.
421. Id. at 832. The court also noted that not all birth certificates were sealed, and
that whether a certificate would be sealed was up to the adoptive parents, the child, or
the court, and not to the birth mother. Id. at 832-33.
422. Id. at 836.
423. See Editorial, Adoption Papers; Courts Consistently Rule in Favor of Open Re·
cords, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 14,2000, at 10.
424. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 (1991).
425. Id. §§ 36-1-128 to -129. The contact veto is not available in connection with records existing prior to March 16, 1951, which were not sealed at the time they were
created. Id. §§ 36-1-127 to -128. When an adoptee obtains records, he must identify
persons or classes of persons who are eligible to refuse contact and with whom he
wishes to establish contact. "The state then attempts to contact such persons, whether
or not they have filed a contact veto, so that they may confirm, vary, or withdraw an
already filed veto." If such persons cannot be located after diligent search, then there
is no restriction against contact. Id. §§ 36-1-130 to -131.
426. Id. § 36-1-132.
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mothers to familial privacy, reproductive privacy, and the nondisclosure of private information. 427 In subsequent state court litigation, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in 1999, upheld the statute, deciding under the state constitution that the law neither impaired
birth mothers' vested rights nor violated their right to privacy.428 The
court noted that early state law did not require sealing records, and
that later law permitted disclosure upon "a judicial finding that disclosure was in the best interest of the adopted person and the public,"
with no requirement that birth parents be notified or have an opportunity to veto contact.429 The court found that "[t]here simply has
never been an absolute guarantee or even a reasonable expectation
by the birth parent" that records would never be opened. 430
V.

CONCLUSION

In sum, adoption law did not proceed in a simple, single step
from a period in which court and birth records were closed to the
public to a period in which the records were permanently closed to all
of the parties. Instead, a more complete and accurate history of the
law reveals interim periods, lengthy ones in many states, in which
court records were closed to all, while birth records, as recommended
by social service and legal authorities, were closed to everyone except
the adult adoptees whose births they registered. Laws closing adoption records to the parties were enacted not as a shield to protect
birth parents from their adult children's ever learning their identity,
but as a sword to prevent them from interfering with the adoptive
families raising the children. This rationale was ubiquitous into the
1960s, and it is only later that an additional rationale achieves widespread currency: the rationale of protecting birth parents' lifelong
privacy by prohibiting adult adoptees' access to birth records.
The observation that "law is culture"431 is nowhere more apt than
in this history of adoption law. The earliest laws prohibiting adult
adoptees' access to birth records reflected not an instrumental goal of
protecting birth parents from discovery by adult adoptees but instead
427. Doe v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702, 706-08 (6th Cir. 1997).
428. See Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919 (Tenn. 1999).
429. [d. at 925.
430. [d.
431. Geoffrey P. Miller, Circumcision: A Cultural-Legal Analysis, N.Y.U. PUB. L. &
LEGAL THEORY (1999), available at http://www.ssrn.com. The kind of analysis Professor Miller performed could provide another productive way to examine the history of
birth records access. He examined how the legal and cultural meaning of circumcision
has changed from the late nineteenth century through the present. He used a set of
polarities around which our culture's concept of the good is organized: purity and pollution, health and harm, self and others, natural and unnatural, beauty and deformity,
gender-appropriate and gender-inappropriate, order and chaos, good and bad, and true
and false.
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a social understanding of adoption as a perfect and c,Omplete substitute for creating a family by childbirth. As a widespread legal regime
of partial secrecy developed-with court records sealed and birth records closed to all except adult adoptees-negative social meanings
became attached to adult adoptee interest in birth families, and the
understanding became firmly established that lifelong secrecy was
an essential feature of adoptions in which the birth and adoptive
parents did not know one another. The potency of this understanding
was apparent from the 1960s onward, when it was increasingly
threatened by radical social change. The understanding itself and the
social meanings associated with it were increasingly discounted and
were directly challenged by the individual actions and group advocacy of adoptees and birth parents. At the same time, in defensive
constructions of the understanding and meanings, adoptees' interest
in birth families came to be seen as being in conflict with birth parents' right to or guarantee of lifelong anonymity, and a substantial
minority of states moved to extinguish adult adoptees' legal right to
access birth records.
It is no wonder that to many adoptees and birth parents the law
has seemed painfully incongruent with experience. Those adoptees
who have sought and been unable to obtain identifying information,
either through a variety of private channels or through public registries, have felt acutely the stern social opprobrium of sealed birth records laws. Birth parents who have supported adoptees' opposition to
closed records have felt, understandably in light of the history recounted here, that lifelong anonymity was a harsh consequence of
their circumstances rather than a benevolently bestowed protection.
The pain caused by having one's deepest feelings met with official
censure is conveyed by open records advocates' quotation of a florid
but fervent statement by a government authority. In an unpublished
trial court decision reversed by the South Carolina Supreme Court,
the judge wrote:
The law must be constant with life. It cannot and should not ignore
broad historical currents of history. Mankind is possessed of no
greater urge than to try to understand the age-old questions: "Who
am I?" "Why am I?" Even now the sands and ashes of the continents are being shifted where we made our first steps as man. Religions of mankind often include ancestor worship in one way or
another. For many, the future is blind without a sight of the past.
Those emotions and anxieties that generate our thirst to know the
past are not superficial and whimsical. They are real and they are
"good cause" under the law of man and God. 432

Although the movement of the states toward greater openness
432. Bradey v. Children's Bureau, S.C. Ct. Com. PI., Apr. 9, 1979, quoted in Harrington, supra note 262, at 38.
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has been slow and cautious, it has been nationwide and its pace has
been accelerating sharply in recent years. 433 The numerous passive
and active registries are being supplemented or supplanted by the
growing number of states opening all records, re-opening records not
closed at their inception, opening records prospectively, or opening
all or some records subject to disclosure vetoes by birth parents.
These changes both reflect and foster the difficult process of deconstructing lifelong secrecy. It may be expected that one day the number of states opening birth records will reach a critical "tipping
point,"434 a point after which a majority of states will reject lifelong
secrecy as expeditiously as they once embraced it.

433. The trend toward more open birth records represented by the laws described
and cited in this Article is not negated by a recent rash of "safe haven" or "Baby
Moses" laws, designed to address the small number of cases nationwide in which newborn babies are abandoned and often die as a result. These laws typically provide for a
parent of a newborn to leave the child anonymously at designated locations. AB of the
fall of 2000, fourteen states had passed such laws and approximately twelve others
had considered doing so. These laws have been criticized on the ground that the children will never be able to learn the identity of their parents or information about their
medical histories. See Michael S. Raum & Jeffrey L. Skaare, Encouraging Abandonment: The Trend Towards Allowing Parents to Drop Off Unwanted Newborns, 76 N.D.
L. REV. 511 (2000); Jacqueline L. Salmon, For Unwanted Babies, a Safety Net; More
States Offer "Havens" to Deter Abandonment, but Critics Abound, WASH. POST, Oct. 20,
2000, atAl.
434. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE
A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000) (analyzing the spread of social phenomena from a mathematical perspective).

